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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement were

binding upon the Plaintiffs.
A.

Whether the Family Settlement Agreement was a legal

contract which did not require court approval to bind the signing
parties.
B.

Whether the Plaintiffs are equitably prevented from

repudiating the terms of the Family Settlemeint Agreement.

2.

Whether the lower court was correct in concluding that the

alleged spendthrift trust did not affect the validity of the Family
Settlement Agreement or the ability of the court to approve it.
A.

Whether the inter vivos trust is merely illusionary

and contains no assets.
B.

Whether Plaintiffs have renounced any interest in it

and are estopped from claiming under it.
C.

Whether Section 75-3-1101 U.C.A. makes a family settle-

ment agreement binding upon the parties even if it affects a trust
or inalienable interest.
D.

Whether it can be said that the termination of the

trust is in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
3.

Whether proper notice was given to necessary parties to

Section 75-3-1102 (c) therefore making approval of the Family Settlement Agreement proper.
4.

Whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on the

intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, duress, and
failure of consideration.
A.

Whether - under Philippine law there is a cause of action

for intentional infliction of emotional harm.
B.

Whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs produced suf-

ficient evidence to state
C.

claim.

Whether Plaintiffs were entitled as a matter of right

to have a jury decide these issues and whether the lower court
correctly ruled in favor of the Defendants based upon all of the
evidence.
D.

Whether Plaintiffs waived any right they had to a jury

by their conduct.
-2-

5.

Whether the lower court correctly applied the evidence in

this case in concluding that there was adequate consideration exchanged between the parties.
A.
in evaluating

Whether this Court should adopt a "good faith" standard
the adequacy of considerations in family settlement

agreements.
B.

Whether the evidence in this case supports a finding

of good faith as well as bona fide claims.
6.

Whether the Findings of the lower court comply with Rule

52 U.R.C.P. and provide an adequate basis for appellate review.
CROSS APPEAL
Whether the lower court erred in failing to award Defendants
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred to enforce the Family Settlement
Agreement.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Three sections of the Uniform Probate Code are pertinent to this
appeal—Section 75-3-912, 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102.

These sections

are set forth in the Addendum to this Brief.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants incorporate those portions of the Nature of the Case
contained in Appellants' Brief (Appellants' Brief, pp. 5-10) which
relate to the sequence of procedural events.

Defendants do not

incorporate those portions of the text which editorialize or which
emphasize procedural events for the benefit of the Plaintiffs.

As

to this cross appeal it should also be noted that the lower court
denied Defendants' claim for attorneys' fees (CR 1256) and that a
timely appeal was taken from that order (CR 1271) .

-3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs-Appellants have presented a lengthy and colorful
"Statement of Facts" in their Brief.

(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 10-31).

The picture painted by Appellants is that of two sisters and their
respective husbands who would virtually stop at nothing to intimidate
and coerce Maxine Grimm and her children into agreeing to give the
scheming daughters a much larger percentage of the Edward Grimm
estate than they could ever possibly hope to obtain by any legal or
ethical course of conduct.

In desperation the appellants were

finally driven to the breaking point, according to this scenario,
and reluctantly agreed to enter into the Family Settlement Agreement
to their great detriment and sorrow.

AppelLants conclude this story

by showing that the defendants continued to make life miserable for
them and finally after regaining their strength and resolve the
plaintiffs repudiated the Family Settlement Agreement and sought
judicial relief from the document which they acknowledged they all
signed.
This "Statement of Facts" would have made an excellent outline
for a closing statement to a fact finder.

It basically includes all

of the direct evidence favorable to the plaintiffs' position and, in
addition, takes every opportunity to make innuendos and insinuations
as to any implied evidence or conclusions.

While Plaintiffs maintain

that their Statement focuses "on the documentary exhibits and the
testimony of the defendants and their witnesses" (Appellants1 Brief,
p. 11), a review of their citations shows this is incorrect.

A

majority of the references utilized in the Statement of Facts refer
to testimony of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs1 witnesses, or the
plaintiffs' exhibits.
-4-

Defendants maintain that while the "Statement of Facts" submitted by the plaintiffs contain an entertaining version of the
facts as viewed by the plaintiffs during the many years that this
controversy developed, it is nonetheless an improper view for purposes
of this appeal.

Even in equity cases, as loi|ig as there is substantial

evidence to support the findings of the lowea court, this Court must
view the findings favorably

t
and not substitute

its own judgment

except to prevent manifest injustice if the evidence clearly preponderates against the Court's findings.

Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d

1017 (Utah 1982); Provo City v. Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah 1978) .
With this standard of appellate review jLn mind, Defendants shall
rely upon the Findings of Fact entered by the lower court as to
Findings 1 through 64.

The additional findings of the lower court

will be cited during the Argument portion of I the Brief.

In addition,

supplementary material will be added to the tindinas in order to

I
clarify certain of the events and to refute ^ome of the allegations
Material which was not
contained in Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts
originally found in the Findings of the lowetr court will be included
in brackets [] with the exception of the subheadings used throughout
the Statement of Facts which are not found in the original court
Findings.

The transcript and record designation utilized by the

appellants in their Brief will be utilized hbre (Appellants1 Brief,
p. 9) and, in addition, the name of the witn|ess giving the testimony
will be inserted for further clarification.
The Early Grimm Family History 1)929-1958
Grimm (GRIMM) married
1. On February 22, 19 26, Edward Miller]
defendant Juanita Kegley Grimm (JUANITA) . [|Juanita Grimm, TRB 111].
They resided in the Philippine Islands from 1926 until 1937.
-5-

[Juanita

Grimm, TRB 110-112].

Two children were born of that marriage,

defendant Ethel Grimm Roberts (ETHEL), born in 1928, and defendant
Juanita Grimm Morris (NITA), born in 1930.
2.

[Id.].

In 19 37, defendants JUANITA, ETHEL and NITA moved to San

Francisco.

[Id.].

GRIMM remained in the Philippine Islands and

later served in the U.S. Army in the South Pacific.

(Maxine Grimm,

TRA 18-19].
3.

In 1945, plaintiff Maxine Tate Grimm (MAXINE), employed

as a Recreational Director by the American Red Cross, met GRIMM in
the Philippines.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 11].

[During this time period

Grimm served as a Colonel for General Douglas MacArthur's staff and
was responsible for sea logistics.
4.

(Id.)].

In 1947, without personally contacting JUANITA, GRIMM came

to the United States and filed a Complaint for Divorce in Reno,
Nevada (PX-1).

[PX-2, 3 ] .

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 15; Juanita Grimm

Morris, TRB 112-113] .
5.

GRIMM came to Nevada, established residency for the sole

purpose of obtaining a divorce and, other than meeting the divorce
residency requirement, GRIMM was never an actual resident of Nevada.
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 4 22].
6.

On June 2, 194 7, a Decree of Divorce was entered, divorcing

JUANITA and GRIMM (PX-3).

Three weeks later, on June 25, 1947, GRIMM

and MAXINE were married in Tooele, Utah.
7.

[PX-5].

Following the marriage, GRIMM and MAXINE returned to the

Philippines.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 18]. They maintained homes in the

Philippine Islands and Tooele, Utah, which homes they could occupy
when not traveling.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 28].

They occupied the home

in the Philippine Islands most of the time except for the last two

-6-

years of GRIMMfS life when the Grimms spent more time in Tooele,
Utah.

[Id.].

Islands.

GRIMM died November 27, 1977, in the Philippine

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 75].

[During this entire period of

time Grimm remained an American citizen.
8.

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 9)].

Two children were born to GRIMM and MAXINE, Edward Miller

Grimm II (PETE), born in 19 51, and Linda Grimm Lawyer (LINDA), born
in 1953.
9.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 10].

I
I

In 1947, ETHEL, GRIMM'S daughter by his first marriage,

returned to the Philippines.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 26]. She married

Pat McFadden, an employee of GRIMM.
by that marriage.
after 1947.
10.

[Id.].

They had six children

She divorced Mr. McFadden and married Rex Roberts

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 27].

After the Second World War, GRIMM rebuilt and developed

his various businesses.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 19].

[A large part of

this effort was made with his long-time partner Charles Parsons.
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 20-21) .

Through their combined effort they

established businesses in maritime shipping throughout the Philippines,
Hong Kong and Japan.

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 20-22) .

In addition, Grimm

owned an American company established in Utah called Globe Investment
Company.

(DX-272)].
The Later Years of Edward Grimm 1959-1977

11.

In 1959, GRIMM executed two wills prepared by a lawyer in

California.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 214]. The first will was referred to

as the Non-Philippine Will (PX-6).
as the Philippine Will (PX-7).

The second will was referred to

In general, under the Philippine Will

ETHEL and NITA would receive that portion of the estate to which they
would be entitled under Philippine law if they were compulsory heirs.
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 41]. Under the Non-Philippine Will, ETHEL and
-7-

NITA would receive nothing.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 40].

[Plaintiffs describe the "Law of Legitime11 in their Brief as
that peculiar doctrine under Philippine law which requires compulsory
inheritance of certain heirs.

They then continue with the statement

that this law of legitime was not applicable "to Mr. Grimm1s estate
regardless of whether he was domiciled in Utah or in the Philippines."
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 14). This conclusion rests upon the testimony
of Emilio Benavince, a Philippine lawyer, who testified on behalf of
the Plaintiffs.

The statement contained in Appellants1 Brief is

correct as far as it goes.

However, upon cross-examination Mr.

Benavince acknowledged that the doctrine of renvoi (a principle used
in conflict of law disputes) is applicable in the Philippines.

A

telegram sent by an attorney retained by Maxine Grimm in 1978 concluded that if the doctrine of renvoi applied, then the Philippine
courts would apply the Philippine law of succession even if that were
inconsistent with Utah law.

(DX-253).

Thus, while Appellants in

their Statement of Facts present the question of legitime law as one
without dispute, the evidence is to the contrary and the arguments
presented by Defendants1 trial counsel illustrate
question raised under the conflict of law rule.
12.

the substantial
(TRB 771-779)].

After 1959, assets situated outside the Philippines became

significantly greater.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 215-216].

In 1964, GRIMM

organized Globe Investment Company, essentially a holding company
for real properties located in the United States.

[DX-272].

In

addition, Globe had a wholly-owned subsidiary, Proud Porker Ranch, a
hog farm in Tooele, Utah (DX-272, PX-12).

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 177].

On the other hand, Luzon Stevedoring was sold in 1964 and Everett
Steamship Lines in 19 76, both substantial companies owned by GRIMM
-8-

and Charles Parsons.
13.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 24, 216].

In the summer of 1976 [sic], GRIMM came to Utah for medical

treatment.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 44]. While in Utah, he caused a trust

agreement to be prepared.
14.

[PX-11; Maxine Grimm, TRA 44].

On July 12, 19 77, GRIMM executed the Trust Agreement naming

PETE Trustee and MAXINE, PETE and LINDA as beneficiaries.
Maxine Grimm, TRA 45-4 8].

[PX-11,

When the Trust Agreement was executed, the

only assets purportedly transferred to the Trustee were the share of
Globe Investment Company (PX-8).
15.

[PX-11, Pete Grimm, TRB 439-442].

In July of 1977, GRIMM returned to the Philippines.

[Maxine

Grimm, TRA 52]. He was not in good health and from September through
November of 1977 his health deteriorated to the point that death was
imminent.
16.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 54-57].
On August 16, 1977, certain assignments were executed by

GRIMM purporting to place most Philippine assets of GRIMM in trust
(PX-14, 15).
TRB 443-450].

[PX-16 through PX-55; Maxine Gpimm, TRA 53; Pete Grimm,
[The transfer of the Globe Investment Company stock

was also reflected in the stock ledgers of the company on July 12,
1977, and a new stock certificate was issued and delivered to Pete
as Trustee.
17.

(PX-12; PX-13)].

It is questionable if the assignments were in fact properly

delivered to the Trustee because PETE testified that he placed the
assignments in his dad's safety deposit box which was in the name of
E. M. Grimm.

[Pete Grimm, TRB 541].

In October or November of 1977

but prior to GRIMM1S death, MAXINE took the contents out of GRIMM'S
safety deposit box and placed the contents in a safety deposit box
in her name.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 223-225; Pete Grimm, TRB 542]. It

was not until after the death of GRIMM that she placed the Trustee's
-9-

name on the box.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 225]. PETE wrote on November

14, 1977, "Before transferring them (stocks) I think we should get
their (Kirton, McConkie) opinion" (DX-302).
18.

[Pete Grimm, TRB 544-47].

As previously stated, GRIMM sold his interest in Everett

Steamship Company in 1976.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 216]. At the time of

his death on November 27, 1977, GRIMM was owed three payments of
$984,092.31 each, due June 30, 1978, June 30, 1979, and June 30, 1980
(DX-272, p. 9 ) .

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 345]. GRIMM made no effort to

transfer the Everett receivable or certain land located in Daggett
County, Utah, to the Trust.

[Pete Grimm, TRB 449].

Events Surrounding Edward Grimm's Death
October-December 197 7
19.

On October 1, 19 77, GRIMM entered Makati Medical Center

where he remained until his death.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 56].

that time, his medical condition steadily deteriorated.

During

[Maxine Grimm,

TRA 57]. Prior to October 19 77, the relationship between ETHEL and
REX on the one hand, and GRIMM, MAXINE, PETE and LINDA on the other
hand, was cordial, friendly and close; they were all supportive and
helpful of one another during GRIMM1S last illness.

[Maxine Grimm,

TRA 59, 243; Ethel Roberts, TRA 483-84; Rex Roberts, TRB 921-22,
Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1080].
20.

NITA'S relationship with her father and with MAXINE, PETE

and LINDA also was a good relationship.

[Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB

1080] .
21.

In November 1977, just prior to GRIMM1S death NITA visited

her father in the Makati Medical Center.
10 80].

[Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB

Her trip from California was paid for by MAXINE.

[Maxine

Grimm, TRA 60].
22.

While NITA was in the Philippines, she also visited with
-10-

Charles Parsons and his wife.

[Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1081] .

Mr. Parsons was a business associate, friend, and partner of GRIMM
in several business ventures located in the Philippines and in Hong
Kong, including G-P & Co., FEMOLA and Hong Kong Transportation Co.
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 20-21] .

During that visit, NITA was informed by

Parsons that there was a trust in existence cind that it was unfavorable
to ETHEL and NITA.

[Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1082].

[Juanita Grimm Morris testified that as she began to think of
the inflection in Mr. Parsons1 voice as he told her about the trust
agreement, she began to cry hysterically.

She reported this conversa-

tion to Ethel, at which time a meeting was arranged with Maxine concerning the trust.

On November 7 a meeting occurred with Juanita,

Ethel and Maxine, at which time the two sisters were allowed to review
a copy of the Trust Agreement and Maxine promised she would have one
made for them.

(Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1082-85) .

Ethel Roberts

testified that Maxine did not supply them with a copy of the Trust or
its listed assets and that therefore on November 17, 1977 she wrote a
letter to Maxine requesting a copy of the Trust and asset list.

In

her letter she stated that "it is a shock to Nita and me to learn
about your Trust, which I understand deliberately eliminates her
completely and includes me for $10,000.

Is this a fair and proper

share of my father's estate?"

(A copy of this exhibit is

(PX-70).

included in the Addendum to the Brief).

Ethel Roberts stated that it

was not her intent to put pressure upon Mrs. Grimm but only to obtain
a copy of the Trust Agreement.

She testified she was not asking

Maxine for a large portion of the estate but merely the opportunity
to look at the Trust Agreement.

(Ethel Roberts, TRA 498-500)].

[On November 7, 19 77 Maxine Grimm sent a letter to Bob Morris,
-11-

Nita's husband, thanking him for allowing her to come and visit.
In the letter she stated:
I especially appreciate her leveling with me.
The trouble with all of us, Bob, is that we get
so involved in our own hurt and problems that we
forget others have them too. I should have known
this about Nita without her having to say it. It's
hard to face yourself when you know how wrong you
have been. Fortunately we can all change. I hope
from now on that we can be a very clos€> family.
* * *

Thanks for being so patient with ctll of us
and so good to Nita and being so good yourself.
Love you Bob,
Maxine
(DX-286).

(A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to

the Brief)].
23.

During GRIMMfS last illness MAXINE had consulted with

Britt McConkie, who was in the Philippine Islands for the L.D.S.
Church and who was also a mebmer of the law firm of Kirton, McConkie,
Boyer & Boyle

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 230-231].

[In order to appease

NITA and ETHEL'S concern about distribution of the estate, Maxine
Grimm decided that new testamentary papers should be prepared for her
husband.
24.

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 246)].
In November 1977, before GRIMM'S death, MAXINE directed

PETE, who was then residing in Utah, to consult with Mr. McConkie's
law firm in Utah and have documents prepared which would treat ETHEL
and NITA equally with PETE and LINDA, and give MAXINE one-half of
GRIMM'S estate.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 233, 246; Pete Grimm, TRB 453;

Linda Grimm, TRB 426-27].
25.

Pursuant to MAXINE'S direction, PETE conferred with the

law firm of Kirton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle.
-12-

[Pete Grimm, TRB 544].

PETE reported his conference to GRIMM, MAXINE and LINDA by letter
dated November 14, 1977 (DX-302).

[Pete Grimm, TRB 545-47].

[The

November 14 letter expresses Pete's concern that he is unable to find
a "Philippine Will" which is referenced in the Utah Will which he had
in his possession.

In the letter he also states:

The lawyer here is talking as if the estate could
come under the laws of (the Philippines)—(not Utah as
King had proposed)--and if that's the case, Mom probably
already owns one-half of everything. . . that's where
there could be problems with a trust with transferring
those stocks to my name right away. Before transferring
them I think we should get their (Kirton & McConkie's)
opinion.
(DX-30 2 ) .

(A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to

the Brief)].
direction.

New documents were prepared in accordance with MAXINE'S
[Pete Grimm, TRB 545]. These documents were sent to the

Philippines but did not arrive before GRIMM'S death on November 27,
1977.

[Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 426].
[On November 2 8 Ethel Roberts invited Linda over for lunch.

Linda told Ethel that they had found a will in Utah but were not sure
what it contained.

(Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 417)].

Maxine Returns to Utah - Dec. 1977 - Jan 1978
26.

On December 1, 1977, the day before MAXINE and LINDA left

for Tooele, Utah, to attend the funeral, REX and ETHEL visited to say
goodbye.

[Rex Roberts, TRB 925]. At that meeting, they inquired

about a will.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 246]. MAXINE denied any knowledge

of a will and, in her own words, "blew up."
247; Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 417] .

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 121,

It was a very emotional time for

all involved and a very emotional meeting.

[Linda Grimm Lawyer,

TRB 416, Rex Roberts, TRB 926].
[While on the plane Linda wrote Ethel a letter.
said in part:
-13-

This letter

I wanted to write and thank you for all the help
you gave Mom and Dad while Dad was in the hospital,
especially before I came. I had intended to write you
from Utah, but before I got a chance to I was in Manila.
I also want to thank you for inviting me over for lunch.
I really enjoyed it—and the talk we had.
I asked Mom why she told you she knew nothing about
a 1959 will after I had already told you I knew Pete had
found one. She actually didn't remember anything about
it. So, I don't want you to think she didn't want you
to know about it. I think all the pressure was building
up. I will have Pete send you what info we find as soon
as we get things straightened around.
(PX-73).
27.

(A copy of which is attached to the Addendum to the Brief)].
While en route to Utah, MAXINE wrote a letter to ETHEL

which said, in part:
Dearest ETHEL Please forgive me for blowing u p — I was so ashamed.
. . . I am also sorry about all the mix-up on the will bit.
[I don't really think I knew what I was saying. I am still
confused over it so I shall wait until I get to Utah and
write you from there.] . . . .
[I just hope we can be the best of friends. I plan
to spend more time in Manila and I really need your
friendship and help.]
[I never realized until yesterday the impact of your
feeling about disinheritance. I wish now I had insisted
on knowing more. You have already learned this lesson. If
you recall, you were the one to warn me.]
[I was so sure your daddy would live to straighten out
all the problems. Perhaps he died so we could become big
enough to solve them ourselves. I am sure we can.]
Thanks so much for your support during those trying
days.
Love,
Maxine
(DX-202).

IA copy of which is attached to the Addendum to the Brief].

The letter is indicative of MAXINE'S desire to continue harmonious family relationships with ETHEL'S family.
28-

MAXINE also wrote REX, ETHEL'S husband, thanking him for
-14-

all his help in the past and then.

(DX-287).

[The letter stated

that Mrs. Grimm was grateful for Mr. Roberts1 taking care of Linda
the night before and that she was sorry that he was in the middle
of all the problems but

indicated she felt that when you marry into

a family you marry their problems as well.

She thanked him for

giving Ethel and their children the feeling of security they needed
so badly.

She thanked him for his help and support and stated she

could never have made it without all of his help.

In closing she

asked him to check the lock on the bodega by the back stairs while
she was away.

(DX-28 7).

to the Brief).
29.

(A copy of which is attached to the Addendum

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 248-252)],

During December 19 77, the relationship between MAXINE,

ETHEL, REX, NITA, LINDA and PETE was still cordial but strained due
to the emergence of the trust, whose terms were not favorable to
ETHEL and NITA.

[Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 432] .

Correspondence and

communications were sent and received during the month of December
also showing a desire on behalf of all family members to resolve the
matter amicably.

(PX-75, PX-76, PX-77, PX-78).

[Copies of these

exhibits are attached to the Addendum to the Brief; (Maxine Grimm,
TRA 85-89)].
30.

ETHEL was appointed Special Administratrix by the Philippine

court on January 12, 1978, which was in accord with Mr. Salisbury's
[sic] recommendation.

(PX-80).

[Ethel Roberts, TRA 503, 521, TRB

1040-43; Rex Roberts, TRB 636]. On January 18, ETHEL wrote MAXINE
reporting her temporary appointment and informing MAXINE of the
hearing date when a regular administrator would be appointed.
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 92-93)].

(PX-81).

[The letter from ETHEL to MAXINE read,

in part:
-15-

I went to consult some lawyers as you advised and
they told me it would be best for all of us to have someone
in control here. Accordingly I have been appointed Special
Administratrix in the Philippines. All the heirs are
represented. It has been difficult for me as I have had
no answer from you as to my queries. The hearing will be
March 13. I hope you will be able to be here before.
* * *

I truly hope Maxine, and Pete and Linda, that we
can come up with a fair and equitable solution to satisfy
all of us. I am saddened to think that you never considered us as being equally Daddy's children. I never
thought of it any other way.
With Love,
Ethel
(PX-81).

(A copy of which is attached to the Addendum to the Brief)].

[Ethel Roberts testified that frequently while her father and
Mrs. Grimm were out of the country she and her husband would perform
periodic checks upon the residence.

She testified that they became

concerned about the safety of the valuables in the house because of
the presence of robbers in the area and inadequate guards at the
residence, as well as the absence of any responsible person living
in the house.

(Ethel Roberts, TRB 17-21).

Rex Roberts further testi-

fied that during this period of time he placed additional barbed wire
across the front of the compound and erected a high barricade across
the front also.

He also extended the wall on the western side of the

compound and built a four- or five-foot extension so no one could
walk around one compound to the other.
light at the corner.

Finally, he erected a flood-

(Rex Roberts, TRB 948) .

He stated he had reason

to fear for the security of the possessions in the premises for the
reasons stated by his wife, and also was afraid that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (the IRS in the Philippines) was going to come into
the home and take an inventory without Mrs. Grimm's being present.

-16-

(Id. TRB 928) .

Maxine Grimm acknowledged in her testimony that she

had written Exhibit 287 asking the Robertses to check on the security
of the house and that she expected the Robertses to look after the
house while she was gone.

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 248-52).

She also

admitted that there were problems with the guards sleeping on the
job at her residence.

(Id. TRA 268)].

The Dispute Begins - Jan. 1978 - Feb. 1978
[While Mrs. Grimm was in Utah, and after receiving PX-81 informing
her of Ethel's appointment as temporary Administratrix, Maxine contacted David Salisbury, a partner in the firm of VanCott, Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy.

She reported to Mr. Salisbury the conversations

she had had with Ethel prior to the time she left the Philippines and
also showed him the letter she had received from Ethel.

(Maxine

Grimm, TRA 100)].
31.

On January 24, 1978, ETHEL and REX visited MAXINE1S house

in the Philippines and, without the express permission of MAXINE,
removed certain valuables from the house for safekeeping.
TRB 930-33; Ethel Roberts, TRB 17-27].
all items removed.

(PX-85, 86).

[Rex Roberts,

An inventory was prepared of

[PX-82; Ethel Roberts, TRB 22-25].

After learning of the appointment and the removal of items from her
home, Mr. Salisbury prepared a cable to ETHEL objecting to the appointment and made demand that items taken from the house be returned.
(PX-88).

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 115-17].

[After Mrs. Grimm returned to the United States, Ethel consulted
with a non-practicing lawyer friend named Mr. Ilisorio.

She told him

that she did not know what the situation was as to her fatherfs estate
and had asked Maxine for any wills but had been ignored.

She told him

that she knew Maxine had been transferring assets from the safety
-17-

deposit boxes which included stock deposits.

She told him that she

was personally asked to provide food for the pigs and monkey food for
the Grimm house, since there was no money for the pearl farm or the
household expenses.

She asked what her position was and what she

should do.

Mr. Ilisorio advised her to consult with the law firm of

Dean Reyes.

He advised her that in order to obtain control of the

situation, the quickest option was to swear that there was no will in
existence since she had not personally seen it.

He told her that this

petition could always be changed if a will was found.
TRA 502-03, TRB 1040-43).

(Ethel Roberts,

She stated, contrary to the assertion made

in Appellants1 Brief at page 19, that while she was aware her father
had a permanent resident visa in the Philippines she did not know
whether Maxine had one or not.

(Ethel Roberts, TRB 15).

It is also

interesting to note that while Appellants observe that Ethel later
amended the petition to allege that Maxine indeed was a resident of
the Philippines "precisely contrary to her perjurious allegation"
(Appellants' Brief, p. 19), they fail to point out that Maxine joined
in the amended petition on the basis that no will had been found and
that the Philippine estate was ultimately settled as if no wills
existed.

(DX-214).

(Pete Grimm, TRB 559). Thus, it is apparent

that all the parties to the estate made an effort to obtain the best
advantage possible to preserve the estate and to minimize the effects
of probate.]
32.

By January 31, 1978, Mr. Salisbury had been made aware by

MAXINE of an income tax case concerning GRIMM'S taxes pending before
the U.S. Tax Court, Washington, D.C., which was being handled by Mr.
Bert Rand for GRIMM prior to GRIMM'S death.
TRA 102].
-18-

[DX-252; Maxine Grimm,

33.

In January and February 1978, Mr, Salisbury was informed

and discussed with MAXINE the fact that for Philippine estate tax
purposes, the estate of non-citizen domicilaries of the Philippines
included all property of the deceased, real or personal, tangible
or intangible wherever situated, except real estate located outside
the Philippines and that the tax rate was 60 percent.

(PX-272).

[sic] [DX-253; David Salisbury, TRB 100].
34.

In January or February 1978, Mrs. Maxine Grimm retained a

lawyer in the Philippine Islands, Mr. Edgardo J. Angara.

[David

Salisbury, TRB 99]. Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Ahgara exchanged telegrams
and conversed by telephone about the numerous questions concerning
the estate, including GRIMM1S domicile and the effect of Philippine
domicile, the law of legitime by which children are compulsory heirs,
and its effect on the trust, the Civil Law doctrine of collation,
the assets subject to taxation in the Philippines and the doctrine
of renvoi as applied to succession from persons having citizenship
different from their domicile.

[PX-174, DX-£43, 254; David Salisbury,

TRB 100-101, 276-78].
On February 17, 1978, Mr. Angara telegr^mmed Mr. Salisbury as
follows:
Please advise us, therefore, whether the disposition
made by the decedent in his Philippine will in accordance
with Philippine Law are contrary to Utah law.
(HH) We would also like to know from you whether
there is a conflict of law rule in Utah providing that
the law of a domicile of the decedent shall govern
successional rights. If there is such a rule, and the
Philippines is held to be the domicile of the decedent
at the time of his death, the Philippine courts will
accept the renvoi or the reference back to Philippine
law, in which case the testamentary dispositions of the
late Mr. Grimm in his Philippine will in accordance with
the Philippine law even if inconsistent with Utah law
will be valid and operative.

-19-

(II) We now turn to the legal effects of the trust
agreement executed by the late Mr. Grimm. Under Philippine law, properties transferred to a trust where the
trustor retains the power to revoke are included as part
of the gross estate in determining the net estate subject
to estate tax.
Furthermore, such trust properties are
subject to collation in determining the compulsory legitimes of the heirs. Thus, if the transfer in trust affects
the legitimes of the heirs, such transfer shall be accordingly reduced; otherwise, the properties held by the
trustee will be left intact.
(FF) Under Philippine law, the order of succession,
the amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity
ot the national law of the decedent, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country,
wherein said property may be found, with respect to an
American citizen, the applicable law will be that of
the state where he is a citizen. In the case of the
late Mr. Grimm, we assume that he was a citizen of the
State of Utah at the time of his death.
We would like to know, therefore, the Utah law on
the order of succession and the amount of successional
rights, particularly whether Utah law recognizes community
of property between spouses and whether the surviving
spouse and the children are considered compulsory heirs
and if so, the amount of their respective successional
rights or what is known in civil law as compulsory
legitimes. [DX-253; (Emphasis added).
(A copy of this
Exhibit is included in the Addendum to the Brief)].
In response to this question from Mr. Angara, Mr. Salisbury said:
It would therefore be my opinion that the Philippine
Will should be governed by Philippine law even though
inconsistent with the laws of the State of Utah because
of the conflict of law rule referred to above. Prior
to the above referred code section, Utah would have adopted
the common law rule that the law of the domicile controls
the validity of the Will and successional rights.
(II) With respect to the legal effect of the
trust agreement, both U.S. and Utah law would be the
same as the Philippine law and include the assets of the
trust in the estate for death tax purposes. However, as
indicated above, under Utah law the assets of the trust
would not be subject to collation in determining the
compulsory share of the heirs. (DX-254). [A copy of this
Exhibit is included in the Addendum to the Brief].
[Mr. Salisbury had a memorandum of law prepared by a lawyer in
his office named William A. Meaders addressing some of the complex
questions of which law would govern the various assets.
-20-

(DX-249;

David Salisbury, TRB 84-98).

Subsequently, after receiving the

cablegram from Mr* Angara, an additional memorandum was prepared
by William A. Meaders.

(DX-255; David Salisbury, TRB 109-10).

The

memorandum stated, in part:
It was our general conclusion that if Mr. Grimm
is determined to have been domiciled in the Philippines
at the date of his death, the Utah Probate Court will
apply the Philippine laws of descent and distribution
to all of his personal property. Utah laws of descent
and distribution will probably be applied to any real
property located in Utah.]
Mr. Benavince, an after the fact witness, was called as an
expert to testify as to the applicability of the Philippine law in
regards to this case.

[Emilio Benavince, TRB 321-403].

Mr. Benavince

testified that pursuant to Article 16 of the Philippine Code that the
law of the country in which the decedent is a citizen is the applicable
law.

[Id. at TRB 347-361].

However, MAXINE, having the benefit of

Mr. Angara's and Mr. Salisbury's opinion did execute the family
settlement agreement.

[PX 58; Maxine Grimm, TRA 253, 299; Pete Grimm,

TRA 527; David Salisbury, TRB 123, 243-44].
At the time of GRIMM'S death, his estate, mostly personal property, was in excess of Eight Million Dollars, with assets situated
in the Philippines, in Hong Kong, and in the United States.

(Merle

Norman, TRB 737; Maxine Grimm, TRA 21; Pete Grimm, TRB 439-441].
There were numerous questions to be resolved.

[Donald Holbrook, TRB

871-72; David Salisbury, TRB 107]. Mr. Salisbury also corresponded
with an attorney in Reno, Nevada, concerning the validity of GRIMM'S
divorce and hence the validity of his marriage to MAXINE.

(DX-250;

Maxine Grimm, TRA 102; David Salisbury, TRB 283-86].
A Settlement Draws Near - Feb. 1978 - March 1978
35.

By February, 19 78, Mr. Salisbury had concluded that it
-21-

might be an advantage to work out a settlement for tax purposes if
the trust could be left intact.

(PX-254).

[DX-254 is a cablegram

sent to Edgardo Angara dated February 21, 1978, and February 24, 1978.
The February 21 cablegram extensively discusses various tax and estate
problems raised by both attorneys.

Mr. Salisbury concluded that it

would be virtually impossible to establish a domicile other than the
Philippines and that the Philippine Will would be goverened by
Philippine law even though it was inconsistent with the laws of Utah
because of the conflict of law rules.

He ended by stating:

There may be some merit after considering all of the
circumstances and discussing the matter with Mrs. Grimm
to try to work out some settlement with the two daughters
by the prior marriage as to the percentage of the Philippine estate in which they will be entitled to participate,
particularly if the assets in the trust could be left intact.
(DX-254, p. 6)].
[In February of 1978 Maxine invited Rex and Ethel to dinner after
returning to the Philippines.

She stated she could not carry hate or

vengeance and prayed for peace of mind and decided she would try to
invite them over to resolve any hard feelings caused by their removal
of her possessions and Ethel's appointment as temporary administratrix.
At dinner they discussed no business relating to the estate but only
pleasant social matters.
36.

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 268-270)].

During March 1978, Mr. Salisbury talked at least five times

with MAXINE about legal issues concerning this estate and the
possibility of settlement.
Grimm, TRA 289-290].

[David Salisbury, TRB 123, 229; Maxine

Mr. Salisbury made calculations as to what

ETHEL and NITA might receive under various assumptions.

[David

Salisbury, TRB 115]. MAXINE told Mr. Salisbury that ETHEL had presented a paper outlining a settlement proposal and had asked her to
sign it.

[David Salisbury, TRB 113]. Mr. Salisbury advised MAXINE
-22-

not to sign and, upon his advice, she did not do so.

[David

Salisbury, TRB 114].
[The "paper" referred to in paragraph 36 of the Findings was a
typed proposal prepared by Ethel Roberts (PX-92; Rex Roberts, TRB 653].
The proposal came about from numerous discussions among Pete, Maxine,
Ethel, and Rex.

(Rex Roberts, TRB 642). At the time Pete Grimm had

completed one and a half years of an MBA degree and basically negotiated on behalf of himself, his mother and sister Linda.
TRB 607-08).

(Pete Grimm,

Maxine expressed her desire to maintain family harmony

and to avoid unpleasantries between the two factions of the family.
(Rex Roberts, TRB 946).

"Ethel's Proposal" (PX-92) developed over a

period of weeks and initially contained nine points.
TRB 6 54) .

(Rex Roberts,

Six of these points were later incorporated into the com-

pleted family agreement prepared by the lawyers.

(Id. TRB 658).

It was decided jointly that Maxine Grimm, Linda Grimm, and Pete Grimm
collectively would receive 75% of the estate with Juanita and Ethel
to receive 25%.

(Pete Grimm, TRB 478-480) .

In order to assure

Maxine a minimum inheritance, it was agreed that in any case she
would receive $1 million plus the Philippine home and the Utah home.
This condition was not listed in Exhibit 92.

(Rex Roberts, TRB 953)].

[Appellants in their Brief attempt to depict Maxine and Pete as
victims of a vicious and brutal attack by Ethel and Rex.
Brief, pp. 29-26) .

(Appellants1

There is no doubt that various claims were being

asserted by the Robertses concerning the validity of Maxine's marriage,
questions regarding taxation, and other matters concerning the estate.
While Appellants attempt to show that these claims were all without
merit, further review of the facts (as will be developed) show that
there were substantial problems involving this complicated estate and
-23-

that all parties concluded it was in their best interest to unite
for tax purposes and to provide a united front against Mr. Grimm's
former partner, Mr. Parsons.

Appellants have carefully selected

only evidence given by their witnesses and have ignored all evidence
to the contrary which shows this mutual negotiated agreement.]
37.

MAXINE was agreeable to and desirous of entering into an

agreement, but wanted it consummated in Utah under Mr. Salisbury's
supervision and wanted to receive her one-half free of tax.

[Maxine

Grimm, TRA 137-142, 272; David Salisbury, TRB 114].
38.

On March 7, 19 78, MAXINE wrote Mr. Salisbury indicating

her desire and need for a settlement.

She said:

I am wondering if our communication is getting
through. We understood that you were going to let us
know if you needed the will. We could have sent it
earlier if we had known. As you know, time is a factor
with us. We cannot do anything until we get that court
order out of our hair. I have talked to Ethel and she
well understands that if we fight we can all lose, so
she is agreeing not to fight, but I still know that
there is great feeling there and she could turn under
pressure, although I think she would be" afraid to. T
have no feeling of pressure anymore. I can talk without
any emotional feelings, so I am grateful for that blessing.
Peter, of course, has no problem. I feel good about the way
he is talkingT As soon as our position is straightened out,
we can begin to act, and then I think we will get more
cooperation. At this time everyone is afraid to do or say
anything, as they know what a horrible thing it would be
if the family fought in court—everything then would get
exposed—good and bad.
I feel that these lawyers are a bit puffed up with
their name and need direction and push,, They are more
apt to follow than lead.
Mail is very slow. We are getting ours in 2 weeks.
You will probably get ours in 4 to 7 days. Clark Air
Base gets theirs in 4 days, but it is a long ride up
there to get it, however, with important papers that
is the best way I think. Sending them by courier is
expensive--$30 plus, but we felt this was the only way
to send the will, as we know of no one going to the States.
Thank you so much for your interest and help. Somehow all of this will come out alright. Are you aware that
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Rand is coming in April? (DX-256). [Emphasis added.
Copy of Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to the Brief.
Maxine Grimm, TRA 274-78].
The Lawyers Begin Their Task - March 1978 - April 1978
39.

In late February or early March 1978, ETHEL and NITA

employed Mr. Donald Holbrook of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
to represent their interests in Utah.

[Donald Holbrook, TRB 868-74;

David Salisbury, TRB 116]. Mr. Holbrook and others in his office
and Mr. Salisbury and others in his office communicated over a
period of several weeks.

[David Salisbury, TRB 115-117; Donald

Holbrook, TRB 874-75, 897, 917].

[Pete Grimm, on March 29, 1978,

sent Mr. Salisbury a letter and a chart asking Mr. Salisbury to
examine it in relation to the inheritance taxes and to Ethel's proposal. (DX-259).
Addendum].

A copy of this Exhibit is attached herein to the

On April 4, 1978, Mr. Holbrookfs office and Mr. Salisbury's

office stipulated to the admission of the non-Philippine will to
probate in Tooele County under certain conditions.

(DX-260).

Salisbury, TRB 120-21; Donald Holbrook, TRB 882-82].

[David

[Mr. Salisbury

did not agree to the probate proceeding until he had talked to Mrs.
Grimm the previous day.
TRA 289-290).

(David Salisbury, TRB 123; Maxine Grimm,

Mr. Holbrook sent a letter to Rex Roberts on April 6,

1978 outlining the possible claims they could assert.

(DX-308).

(A copy of this Exhibit is attached herein to the Addendum)].

Final

negotiations, with REX representing ETHEL and NITA, and PETE representing MAXINE and LINDA consumed at least five days, from April 20
through April 25, 197 8.

[Pete Grimm, TRB 551-57; Rex Roberts, TRB

966-68; David Salisbury, TRB 133-34].

There were at least four

revisions of the first draft prepared by Mr. Salisbury.
DX-261A, DX-263, DX-264, DX 265).
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(DX-261,

[At least one of those revisions

was exchanged between the Salisbury law firn and the Holbrook law
firm.

(DX-264; David Salisbury, TRB 139)].

The final agreement

was incorporated into two documents, the Settlement Agreement and
the Supplemental Memorandum.

(PX-57, 58, 59).

[David Salisbury,

TRB 148].
40.

During the negotiations each side presented points and pro-

posals to advance the positions of their clients.
TRB 133-38; Donald Holbrook, TRB 887-89, 910].

[David Salisbury,

[Mr. Salisbury

testified as to his recollection of his meeting with Donald Holbrook.
He stated that Holbrook indicated the claims that would be made if
the matter had to go to litigation.

Holbrook said he would question

the validity of the divorce of the decedent from the first Mrs. Grimm
and the validity of the marriage to Maxine Grimm.

He also said he

would make whatever claims he could under Philippine law and would
challenge the validity of the trust that had been created in Utah
and the circumstances surrounding its creation.
118)].

(David Salisbury, TRB

PETE and Mr. Salisbury were insistent and [sic] the first

wife, JUANITA, sign the agreement to relinquish any claims she might
have to the estate.

[-David Salibury, TRB 136; Pete Grimm, TRB 555].

During the negotiations it was agreed that MAXINE receive a guaranteed
minimum of $1,500,000 plus her two houses and certain bank accounts
regardless of the eventual size of the estate.
TRB 143-44] .

[David Salisbury,

PETE and Mr. Salisbury also insisted that MAXINE

receive her share without reduction by way of death taxes.

[David

Salisbury, TRB 141; Pete Grimm, TRB 591A; Rex Roberts, TRB 969;
Donald Holbrook, TRB 890]. Negotiations also resulted in an agreement
that PETE and LINDA receive certain bank accounts and that ETHEL and
NITA be guaranteed a minimum.

[Pete Grimm, TRB 554; Rex Roberts,

TRB 969].
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[Rex Roberts testified that the increase of Maxine's guaranteed
minimum from $1 million to $1.5 million, the addition of land
surrounding the houses, allowing Maxine to receive her share before
taxes were paid, and the allocation of the separate bank accounts were
all different from that which was agreed during the discussions
among the heirs in the Philippines.

(Rex Roberts, TRB 969). A

comparison of Exhibit PX-190 (Ethel's proposal), which was prepared
in the Philippines with the actual Family Settlement Agreement,
disputes the statement made in Appellants1 Brief that the "lawyers
only played a peripheral role in the settlement negotiation."

(Appel-

lants1 Brief, p. 24)].
41.
MAXINE.

Mr. Salisbury communicated at least twice in April with
[David Salisbury, TRB

122].

[Maxine and Pete both wanted

to have family harmony and to avoid expensive litigation.
Salisbury, TRB 298-99)].

(David

PETE conferred with Mr. Salisbury on a

continual basis between April 17 and April 25, 1978.
TRB 133; Pete Grimm, TRB 551-57].

[David Salisbury,

On the morning prior to signing

the Family Settlement Agreement PETE represented to Mr. Salisbury
that he had discussed the agreement with his mother (MAXINE) the night
before and that she wanted to go ahead.

[David Salibury, TRB 146].

The Agreement Takes Effect - April 1978 - Jan. 1979
42.

The Agreement was signed on April 25, 1978, by PETE and

LINDA, by PETE as attorney-in-fact for MAXINE and by REX as attorneyin-fact for ETHEL and NITA.

[PX-57, PX-97; Pete Grimm, TRB 487;

Maxine Grimm, TRA 155-56; Linda Grimm, TRB 435].
by both attorneys.

It was also signed

[PX-57; Rex Roberts, TRB 970]. Subsequently a

copy was signed by NITA in California and by ETHEL and MAXINE in
the Philippine Islands.

[PX-58; Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1099; Maxine
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Grimm, TRA 151; Rex Roberts, TRB 972].

[Rex Roberts testified that

when he took the copy of the Family Settlement Agreement to Maxine
in the Philippines she was in a happy mood and told him that it was
the right thing to do for the entire family.
972-75)].

(Rex Roberts, TRB

Pursuant to the Family Settlement Agreement, Mr. Salisbury

was retained as attorney for the Estate to representa 11 of the
"heirs".

[David Salisbury, TRB 248].

43.

The Family Settlement Agreement was not signed as a result

of threats, duress or coercion.

MAXINE was represented by Mr. Salis-

bury who advised Mrs. Maxine Grimm that he had investigated the claims
made by NITA and ETHEL and she did not have to enter into a settlement
agreement if she did not desire to do so.
314].

[David Salisbury, TRB 310-

[Previously, Salisbury had discussed the settlement agreement

with Maxine and said she should not sign it if she felt pressured or
did not have the opportunity to review and reflect upon what she was
doing.

He also told her that in his opinion the 25% figure given

to Nita and Ethel was too generous.

(David Salisbury, TRB 248, 314).

Mrs. Grimm acknowledged this advice, but said she felt it was necessary
to enter into the agreement to end the pressure and disagreement that
had occurred between the family members.

(David Salisbury, TRB 243)].

[Appellants in their Brief state that "Rex acknowledged that
without Maxine, Pete would not have agreed to the FSA."

(Appellants1

Brief, p. 27). This statement incorrectly characterizes Mr. Roberts1
testimony.

He stated that he did not believe that Pete would have

agreed to the entire nine points contained in the FSA, but steadfastly maintained that he would have agreed to some form of settlement
regardless of Maxine's interest.
44.

(Rex Roberts, TRB 1014-16)].

The Family Settlement Agreement was incorporated into two
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separate documents to preserve maximum flexibility for filing of
state tax returns.

[David Salisbury, TRB 148-49, 154; Rex Roberts,

TRB 970].
45.

During the negotiations and afterward, there was a dis-

cussion about the desirability of presenting the Family Settlement
Agreement to the court for approval.

[David Salisbury, TRB 150].

Mr. Salisbury concluded that it was not unusual not to file the
Family Settlement Agreement.

[Id. at 151]. Mr. Salisbury also stated

that the tax consequences were a consideration for not filing the
Family Settlement Agreement with the court for approval.
46.

[Id.].

Mr. Salisbury concluded that it was not in the interest of

the estate to make the agreement a matter of public record at that
time.

It was preferable to preserve maximum flexibility for the Estate

and all signatories to the Agreement.
47.

[David Salisbury, TRB 149-51].

Subsequent to the signing of the Settlement Agreement all

of the parties worked toward and pursuant to the Agreement.

[DX-229,

DX-240, DX-242; Pete Grimm, TRB 560-68].
48.

On May 4, 1978, MAXINE and ETHEL jointly retained the

accounting firm of Price-Waterhouse to be Estate Accountant.

(DX-213).

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 297-99].
49.

On May 19, 1978, MAXINE, PETE and ETHEL filed a Joint

Petition for Letters of Administration in accordance with the terms
of the Agreement (DX-214) [Maxine Grimm, TRA 172] which Petition was
granted and Joint Letters issued on July 2, 1978.

(DX 218).

[Maxine

received many benefits from the Settlement Agreement and, conversely,
Ethel and Nita changed positions in reliance upon the Settlement
Agreement.

If the Settlement Agreement were allowed to be repudiated

the parties as a practical matter could not be returned to status quo.
-29-

For instance, the major assets of the estate, namely, Globe Investment Company, and receivables from the Everett Steamship Company
were excluded from the Philippine Estate (DX 239). If no Settlement
Agreement had been entered into, of course, Ethel and Nita would have
sought that the gross Philippine estate of E. M. Grimm would include
all property, real or personal, wherever situated (DX 253)J.
50.

On June 27, 1978, MAXINE wrote NITA a letter expressing

her pleasure with the Agreement and that "much money will be saved"
because of it.

(DX-292).

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 301-02].

[This letter

refutes the claim by Appellants in their Brief that Maxine was a
beaten woman with no spirit at the time the Settlement Agreement was
entered into.

In one paragraph Maxine told Nita:

I hope you will be pleased with the way we are
running everything. It is so complicated that we
have to tread lightly with everything we do. We are
trying to avoid bankruptcy with the pigs—trying to
make the most out of everything and I really feel
that we are making headway. It has taken some time
to get people to help, but I think now everyone knows
that we are not going to fight in the iamily and are
now willing to help all they can. This is going to
make a tremendous difference and much money will be
saved as a result of it. We have stil] not submitted
any inventory to the court—that is, not since Ethel
did, so we have no details to report, but by the time
Ethel comes she will be able to explain everything to
you. I just wanted you to know that we have not been
idle and in this case doing things cautiously and slowly
I think is best. (DX-213)•
(A copy of this Exhibit is
attached in the Addendum to the Brief)].
[In May of 1978 a conference was held with various tax accountants, lawyers, and Pete Grimm.

As a result of that conference a

letter was prepared on July 10, 1978 by Peat, Marwick & Mitchell,
CPAs to David Salisbury, listing various alternatives as to how the
Everett Steamship installment sale should be treated in the estate.
(DX-268).

The conference as well as the accounting letter made

assumptions as to how the installment contract should be treated
-30-

based upon the provisions of the FSA.
51.

(David Salisbury, TRA 156-62)].

In August of 1978, MAXINE borrowed $500,000 from Globe

Investment Company, an asset of the estate, and before liquid funds
became available, Globe was required to borrow money at 9.65%.
(DX-293, DX-371).
52.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 306; Earl Tate, TRB 670].

On September 20, 1978, Mr. Salisbury wrote to the bene-

ficiaries again reaffirming the Agreement (DX 221).

[Maxine Grimm,

TRB 313]. This letter is the first of a number of reports to the
beneficiaries by Mr. Salisbury concerning the progress of the Estate
pursuant to the Family Settlement Agreement.

[DX-229, DX-240, DX-242;

David Salisbury, TRB 175; Maxine Grimm, TRA 313, 339, 373, 385]. At
no time did MAXINE, PETE or LINDA take exception to any of the reports
of Mr. Salisbury.

[David Salisbury, TRB 170r 175, 258, 262; Maxine

Grimm, TRA 323, 392].
[Another example of the disparity between the plaintiffs1 version
of facts and the defendants' version is illustrated by Appellants'
statement "The Roberts1 accusations and attacks became so intense
in November of 1978 that Maxine finally got up and walked out."
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 29). Ethel Roberts, on the other hand, stated
that during a meeting with Maxine, Pete, Ethel, and Rex, plus an
attorney named Tabo, Maxine became very upset when she was asked a
question about the accounting of the estate.
1057-59).

(Ethel Roberts, TRB

The next day Ethel wrote a letter to Maxine expressing

Ethelfs concern regarding Maxine's behavior.

The letter states in part:

I was dismayed when you walked out on us during
the meeting yesterday morning. I can't understand
what you are trying to accomplish and whether you are
truly sincere or not when you say you are completing
the accounting and will have it finished by the time
Salisbury gets here. And I can't understand why any
mention of an accounting should upset you so much and
why you should take it so personally when you are in
-31-

fact dealing solely with estate funds.
As you and Pete are the only ones with access to
estate funds it is no more than natural that Nita and I
would want to know what is being disbursed and for what . . .
Pete told us you have not been feeling well and I hope
you are better today. Is there anything I can do? Perhaps
you and Pete are trying to do too much yourselves when you
should be having much more professional help.
Sincerely,
Ethel
[PX-110.

A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to

the Brief].
The Agreement Continues to be Enforced
Feb. 1979 - Oct. 1979
53.

In February, 1979, MAXINE obtained an Order for a family

allowance of $3,000 per month retroactive to the date of GRIMM'S
death.
54.

[DX-230; Maxine Grimm, TRA 334-35, 430].
Also in February, 19 79, the U.S. Estate Tax Return was

signed by MAXINE and filed.

[DX-272; Maxine Grimm, TRA 338; David

Salisbury, TRB 178]. The estate tax issue was simplified and aided
by the Family Settlement Agreement in the opinion of Mr. Salisbury.
[David Salisbury, TRB'307].
maximum marital deduction.
55.

Under the return MAXINE claimed the
[DX-272; David Salisbury, TRB 307].

In November of 1978, Mr. Salisbury visited MAXINE in the

Philippine Islands.

[David Salisbury, TRB 172-73].

Again, there was

no indication by MAXINE during that meeting that she wanted to repudiate the Settlement Agreement.

[David Salisbury, TRB 174, 250-51;

258; Pete Grimm, TRB 584-86].
56.

On May 23, 1979, $800,000 of the Everett receivable was

distributed in accordance with the Family Settlement Agreement and
in percentages designated by the Family Settlement Agreement:
-32-

$400,000 to MAXINE and $100,000 each to the four children.
Grimm, TRA 358].

[Maxine

In addition pearls and silver were distributed in

accordance to the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement.

[Rex

Roberts, TRB 936-37].
57.

In September, 1979, the Philippine estate taxes were paid.

[Maxine Grimm, TRA 203-05; David Salisbury, TRB 267].

[Appellants in

their Brief insinuate a wrongful motive on the part of Defendants in
urging that a "bribe" be paid to the Philippine authorities.
lants1 Brief, pp. 29-30).
a bribe."

(Appel-

They state, "Maxine was opposed to paying

The evidence showed that all parties were opposed to

paying this additional sum of money but that the realities of the
Philippines required it.

Mr. Salisbury stated that upon advice of

Philippine legal counsel it was recommended that the 500,000 pesos
payment be made.

Mr. Salisbury talked to Mr. Lingueco, to Mr. Del

Collar--Maxine!s personal lawyer—and Mr. Simon concerning this payment.
All of the attorneys indicated that this is the way it is done in the
Philippines.

(David Salisbury, TRB 300-02).

Salisbury stated that

whereas the term "bribe" may be used in the United States, it would
not be used in the Philippines.

He adamantly stated that had this

been in the United States he would not have recommended it.
368-69)].

(Id.

Because there were not sufficientl liquid funds to pay all

of the estate taxes due, the shortfall was paid by the respective
beneficiaries in accordance with their shares under the Family
Settlement Agreement.

[Rex Roberts, TRB 996; Maxine Grimm, TRA 379].

[Ethel and Nita paid 25% of this amount froml their own funds.
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 335)].
58.

In August, 1979, Mr. Salisbury again visited MAXINE in

the Philippine Islands and traveled with MAXINE to Hong Kong.
-33-

[David Salisbury, TRB 186-87].
59.

In September, 1979, Mr. Salisbury, as part of his regular

reports, provided for a plan of partition in accordance with the
Family Settlement Agreement.
385-90] .

[DX-241; DX 242; Maxine Grimm, TRA

Again, no obligation was made by MAXINE, PETE or LINDA.

(DX-241).

[David Salisbury, TRB 258-62].

[On September 29, 1979 Ethel wrote Maxine a letter.

(DX-24).

In the letter Ethel stated that she had been trying to reach Maxine
for several days and could not do so.

She stated she was concerned

that a brokerage house in which some of the estate money was banked
had closed.

She then stated:

I must insist that you furnish me immediately, today,
a complete accounting of all the Philippine stock assets
which have been in your care and custody since my father's
death. The accounting should include all dividends, cash
and stock.
Also, I want to see the stock certificates that you
are holding.
And please as I have requested before, 1 must again
ask you for the accounting files which I turned over to
Pete and was assured would be returned to me on request.
I have had your continual promise but no files. (DX-243).
(A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to the
Brief)].
60.

On October 1, 19 79, MAXINE wrote ETHEL stating that soon

the beneficiaries would have the actual partition.
Grimm, TRA 401-03].

[DX-244; Maxine

[The letter relates various figures about the

estate and the taxes that had been paid.

The letter then states,

"As to the other things stated in your letter, we are still working
on them.

Since we shall soon have the actual partition, all those

other matters mentioned by you shall be taken care of."

(DX-244).

(A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to the Brief)].
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Maxine Refuses to Cooperate - Oct. 1979 - May 1980
61.

After October, 1979, MAXINE did nothing to cause the

partition of the estate to occur.

[Another glaring example of the

diversion in testimony between Plaintiffs and Defendants and the
Appellants' reliance solely upon their own version of the story concerns the evidence surrounding the pig and pearl farms.

Appellants

in their Brief maintain that the pearl farm was a valued possession
of the decedent, who wanted his daughter Linqla to have it, but that
Rex Roberts bought it "but did not pay for it."

(Appellants1 Brief,

p. 29). This paragraph in Appellants1 Brief implies that Mr. Roberts
took something away from Maxine, Pete, and Linda which they wanted to
retain.

The evidence is to the contrary.

January 18, 19 79, from Pete to Maxine.

DX-306 is a letter dated

In the letter Pete tells his

mother, "I am not sure that I want to manage a farm down there anyw a y — s o Ifm talking.

I'm not sure I like his price though.

Also—

he needs something to keey busy—if he's not working on something he
may get in the way."

Pete Grimm stated in cross-examination that he

was interested in selling the pearl farm because it was a long way
from Manila and it had many problems associated with it.

(Pete Grimm,

TRB 577). Rex Roberts never admitted that he paid no money for the
farm, but, on the contrary, explained in detail how the money was
arrived at and how it was to be paid.

(Rex Roberts, TRB 989-90)].

[Likewise, the story of the pig farm paints two completely
different pictures.

According to Appellants, Rex Roberts wanted the

farm placed in bankruptcy so he could avoid paying the creditors but
Maxine resisted, auctioned off the pig farm, and ultimately paid off
everybody.

(Appellants' Brief, p. 28-29).

To the contrary, Mr.

Roberts testified that the pig farm went into insolvency in November
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of 1978, leaving many creditors.

Maxine, according to Rex Roberts,

only wanted to pay the creditors who were members of Mrs, Grimm's
church.

She did not want to pay the other creditors.

Rex Roberts

objected and said that everyone had to be paid equally.

He eventually

put the farm in involuntary bankruptcy, which he thought saved the
estate approximately 7 million pesos, and held the farm past the
point where general creditors could come in against the estate.

(Rex

Roberts, TRB 979-84)p.
62.

MAXINE did not file an inventory in the Utah Probate pro-

ceeding, and attempted to block any progress toward partition by
failing to communicate with ETHEL and NITA.

[PX-131, PX-137; Maxine

Grimm, TRA 199-202].
[In December of 1979 Mr. Salisbury prepared a letter to be sent
to Maxine.

While he never sent it to Maxine, he showed it to Pete.

He criticized Maxine for not contacting his firm or consulting with
him as to the hiring of accountants and attorneys in connection with
a number of important decisions and stated that this placed him in an
untenable situation as to the other beneficiaries, who were given to
believe that he would be coordinating the legal work involved in
administering the estate.

(PX-281).

(A copy of this Exhibit is

attached herein to the Addendum to the Brief).

(David Salisbury, TRB

199-202)].
63.

On May 14, 1980, a petition for removal was filed on behalf

of ETHEL and NITA requesting MAXINE to be removed as Personal Representative and requesting distribution in accordance with the Family
Settlement Agreement.

[PR 81-84; Maxine Grimm, TRA 411].

The Agreement is Repudiated by Maxine - June 1980
64.

On June 13, 1980, Mr. Rand wrote Mr. Salisbury informing
-36-

Mr. Salisbury that MAXINE, PETE and LINDA were repudiating the
Agreement.

[DX-283; Maxine Grimm, TRA 209-10].

accordingly withdrew.

[Mr. Salisbury

(David Salisbury, TRB 204)].

[Maxine Grimm acknowledged that during the entire course of
proceedings she had been represented by the following attorneys:
Mr. McConkie, Mr. Salisbury, Mr. Rand, and Mr. Berman in the United
States and Mr. Angara, Mr. Limqueco, Mr. Del Collar and Mr. Blanco in
the Philippines.

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 413)].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The terms of the Family Settlement Agreement were binding

upon the plaintiffs in that court approval was not required in order
to make a legally enforceable contract among the parties signing it.
In addition, the conduct of the plaintiffs brings into play a number
of equitable doctrines which would prevent them from being able to
escape the obligations of the Family Settlement Agreement because of
change of positions which have occurred since its execution.
2.

The lower court was correct in concluding that the alleged

spendthrift trust did not effect the validity of the Family Settlement
Agreement or the ability of the court to approve it.

The inter vivos

trust is merely illusionary and in any case contains few assets
because of no proper delivery prior to the decedent's death.

Plain-

tiffs have renounced any interest in the trust and are estopped from
now claiming under it.

Section 75-3-1101, in any event, makes a

Family Settlement Agreement binding upon thq parties even if it
affects a trust or inalienable interests.

It was unquestionably in

the best interests of all of the beneficiaries to enter into this
Agreement and to terminate the trust.
3.

Proper notice was given to all necessary parties pursuant
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to Section 75-3-1102 (c) and the claimed deficiency of Plaintiffs
simply does not exist.
4.

Plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial on their defenses

of duress and failure of consideration once the defendants elected not
to proceed on their counterclaim.

In addition, they were not entitled

to a jury trial on their claim of intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress.
to state a claim.

First, under Philippine law their complaint failed
Second, even if Utah law is applied the evidence is

insufficient to state a claim.

Third, the plaintiffs were not entitled

as a matter of right to have a jury trial or this issue and the lower
court, if it reached that point, properly found the evidence against
the plaintiffs.

Fourth, if Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury deter-

mination they waived this right by failing to make proper objection.
5.

The lower court correctly applied the evidence in this case

to the correct standard in concluding that there was adequate consideration exchanged between the parties creating a binding Family Settlement Agreement.

Although there are two standards in the country used

for evaluating compromise and settlements, the "good faith" standard
is by far the best over the "bona fide claim" standard.

In any event,

under either standard the evidence in this case shows that Defendants
asserted both good faith and bona fide claims thereby providing sufficient consideration for the Family Settlement Agreement.
6.

The Findings of the lower court comply with Rule 52 Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure and provide an adequate basis for appellate review.
The Findings contain factual support for any conclusionary statements.
The failure of the court to include the evidence listed by Plaintiffs
is simply explained by the fact that the court did not find in the
plaintiffs1 favor and therefore rejected their evidence.
-38-

CROSS APPEAL
The lower court erred in failing to award Defendants reasonable
attorneys1 fees in their effort to enforce the Family Settlement
Agreement.

Since there was a specific contractual provision to this

effect the lower court should have awarded fees to compensate the
defendants for this expensive litigation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TERMS OF THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
WERE BINDING UPON PLAINTIFFS.
The plaintiffs attack the validity of the Family Settlement
Agreement on the basis that they had supposedly repudiated the Agreement prior to court approval.

They argue that without such court

approval the Agreement by them was revocable at any time and that
"there is simply no way, given the language of the statute and the
rule, that the Grimms should be held to have been bound to an FSA for
seven years after its execution and four years after its repudiation.
The testators1 intent is entitled to more refepect than that."

(Appel-

lants1 Brief, p. 43). See Appellants1 Brief, pp. 39-43 as to these
arguments.
There are two responses to these contentions.

First, under Utah

law Plaintiffs were bound by the terms of the Agreement regardless of
the fact that the court had not formally approved it.

Second, even if

Plaintiffs had the ability to repudiate prior to court approval, such
ability was lost because of equitable considerations and Plaintiffs
are now precluded from asserting any repudiation claim.
will now be addressed.
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These arguments

A.

The Family Settlement Agreement Was a Legal Contract
and Did Not Require Court Approval to Bind the
Signing Parties.

The lower court entered the following Conclusions of Law:
8. The Family Settlement Agreement was not subject to
repudiation without legal consequences prior to approval by
the court. Failure to obtain court approval does not
invalidate the Family Settlement Agreement. The Family
Settlement Agreement could be presented to the Court for
approval at any time prior to distribution and closing
of the estate.
9. The Family Settlement Agreement is just and
reasonable and should be approved and all fiduciaries
under the supervision of this Court should be directed
to administer and distribute the estate in accordance
with the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement.
CR 1232-1231.
The lower court thus (1) concluded the fact that the court had
not formally approved the Family Settlement Agreement did not give the
plaintiffs the right to repudiate the Agreement without impunity and
(2) formally approved the Family Settlement Agreement pursuant to
Section 75-3-1102, U.C.A.

At this point in time the Family Settlement

Agreement, therefore, has been judicially approved and the only questio
remaining is whether the plaintiffs were able to repudiate it prior to
such approval.
Appellants argue that they had the right to repudiate the Agreemen
at any time prior to this approval, and base such argument upon
Section 75-3-1101 and 1102, U.C.A.

In addition, they cite several

cases from other jurisdictions dealing with repudiation of settlement
agreements as well as this Court's case of In the Matter of the
Estate of Frank Chasel, dealing with an attempt to repudiate a family
settlement agreement.

(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 39-42).

All of Appel-

lants' authorities are either distinguishable or are misplaced.

A

careful review of the statutory scheme in this type of case shows
without doubt that Plaintiffs did not have the right to repudiate
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without suffering severe legal consequences.
This Court in Chasel observed the general rule that "compromise
agreements in estate disputes, even more than in settlement of litigation generally, are encouraged to promote harmony and to prevent the
waste of assets."

12 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Sept. 15, 1986).

This

statement is in accord with the general rule throughout the United
States:
In accord with the general policy of law which favors
the compromise of controversy and the avoidance or termination of litigation, it is said that the law looks with favor
upon agreement of compromise among members of a family which
avoids a will contest or promotes the settlement and distribution of the testator's estate, or, as it is sometimes stated,
that such agreements are favorites of the law. 29 A.L.R.3d
8, 25.
Appellants in their Brief have ignored another section of the
Probate Code which is critical to this type of agreement.

Section

75-3-912, U.C.A. states the following:
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing authorities,
competent successors may agree among themselves to alter the
interest, shares or amounts to which they are entitled under
the will of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy, in
any way that they provide in the written contract executed
by all who are affected by its provisions. . . .
This section clearly allows all of the parties in this lawsuit
who are now named as Plaintiffs and Defendants to contractually agree
as to how the estate of Edward Grimm should be divided.

The Family

Settlement Agreement executed by all of these parties together with
their attorneys certainly would be considered a "written contract"
pursuant to Section 912.
In Matter of Estate of Kruse, 710 P.2d 733 (N.M. 1985) the New
Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the language of Section 912, which
is modeled from the Uniform Probate Code.

In that case, four heirs

entered into an oral agreement as to the division of an estate.
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Certain letters were exchanged between the heirs, including one
written by the defendant acknowledging that an agreement had been
made but repudiating the agreement.

The New Mexico Supreme Court

found that the controlling issue in the case was whether there was
sufficient evidence of a written agreement to have been made before
any repudiation occurred.

In other words, if the contract was valid

the subsequent repudiation was not significant.

The case was remanded

to the lower court to determine whether there was sufficient evidence
to constitute a written agreement.

Of course, here, there is no such

problem.
If Section 75-3-912, U.C.A. allows heirs to enter into written
contracts concerning the distribution of assets of an estate, then
what is the purpose of Section 75-3-1101 and 1102, relied upon by the
Appellants in their Brief?

The answer to this question can be found

by examining an older Michigan case entitled In Re Peck's Estate, 34
N.W.2d 533 (Mich. 1948).

The law of Michigan has been utilized in

the development of the Model Probate Code, which is the source of the
present Utah Probate Code.
U.C.A.

See Editorial Board Comment to §75-3-1102,

In the Peck case an agreement was entered into between the

widow of the decedent and a bank which was cicting as a trustee for
his estate.

The settlement arrangement was never approved by the

probate court.
1946.

The agreement continued in effect from 1934 through

The heirs of the widow brought an action against the bank,

claiming that the settlement agreement was invalid on the basis that
it had not been approved by the probate court.

In dealing with this

contention the Supreme Court of Michigan stated:
It was not necessary to secure the consent of the
Probate Court to the settlement as there were no minors
or unknown heirs involved. The court encourages settlements where there is no fraud or mistake and the parties
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are of age, particularly so where there is a full understanding of the provisions in the settlement and the
parties are represented by able counsel. Id. at 538.
The Court then noted a prior case argued by the heirs in which court
approval was required.

In stating that such approval was not required

in this case the Court stated:
[The existing Michigan law] does provide a method
for securing approval of settlements by the probate court
and the purpose of the act principally was to allow settlements to be made with approval of the court so as to bind
minors and unborn heirs and others whose present existence
or whereabouts cannot be ascertained/ etc. It does not
prevent settlement of controversies by parties legally
competent to act in their own behalf. Id. at 538.
Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized the distinction between
binding legally competent parties and binding parties of a limited
capacity or unknown parties.
The Court of Appeals of Missouri furthet clarified the reason
for the creation of Sections 1101 and 1102.

In Columbia Union National

Bank v. Bundschu, 641 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. App. 1982) a family settlement
agreement had been entered into between several groups of heirs.
Missouri has also adopted the same provision of the Uniform Probate
Code.

The Court noted that heirs could always enter into a settlement

agreement as to the disposition of assets even before the statutory
probate code had been adopted.

However, the court noted:

The new law provides a more defined and competent procedure for that purpose and, as a matter of public policy,
settles and binds not only the parties to the compromise
agreement but also those in interest "uhborn, unascertained,
or who could not be located" according to a prescribed method
of representation and notice. Id. at 874, fn. 7.
Thus, the purpose of 75-3-1101 and 1102 is not to create a
legally binding contract upon the parties to a family settlement agreement, since Section 75-3-912 has already performed this function.
Rather, its purpose is to eliminate any claims by non-party heirs to
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the family settlement agreement in order to place it at rest.

It

is essentially analogous to the purpose of recording statutes in
real estate.

As is true between the parties of a real estate trans-

action, a legal right exists.
1983).

Gregerson v. Jensen, 659 P.2d 396 (Utah

As to third parties, however, whose rights are dependent upon

knowledge of such transaction, the failure to record precludes extinguishment of their interest.

See §57-1-6, U.C.A.

Here, all of the parties were represented by competent counsel,
and after extensive negotiations entered into the Family Settlement
Agreement.

The Agreement continued in effect for nearly two years,

even using Plaintiffs1 view of the evidence, before any repudiation
occurred.

All of the necessary parties in this dispute were parties

to that agreement.

There is no one in the present controversy who

can claim that the lack of court approval somehow impaired their
interest in the estate.

None of the types cf interests referred to

in §1101 andll02 are present in the claims asserted by Plaintiffs, and
therefore these statutes cannot be used by them as an excuse for
breaching their contractual agreement.
None of the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs is applicable to
this type of situation.

This is not a workmen's compensation case in

which those specific statutes govern the rights and liabilities of
employee and employers.

Obviously, the Legislature may feel that an

employee is at an unfair advantage in dealing with his employer in any
claim and therefore may choose to protect that employee by requiring
Commission approval of any agreement entered into with that employee.
This same type of disparity in positions is not found in the present
situation.

In addition, the Safeway Stores, Inc. case and the Mackey

case did not even have signed agreements at the time the settlement
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was being sought.

(Appellants1 Brief, p. 40). Likewise, in the

Bece case only oral conversations between attorneys had occurred.
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 40).
The Dacaney case (Appellants1 Brief, p. 40) is another example
of specific legislation designed to protect a far different class of
people.

In Dacaney a statute of Guam required that before any settle-

ment could be reached regarding a minor, a court would have to approve
the guardian's recommendation.

Here again i$ a legislative prerogative

to protect minors from unscrupulous guardian^ in entering into settlement agreements.

Similarly, in Georgevich (Appellants1 Brief, pp.

40-41) the Federal Rules have required that d Federal District Court
act as a representative of the members of a class whenever a class
action has been approved by the court.

Again, this statutory require-

ment is to protect absent members of the class from unfair settlements
by parties to litigation.

Here, no such protection is required.

Finally, Appellants have on several occasions asked what would
have occurred in the Chasel case of this Court had the will been found
prior to court approval.

It is Defendants1 contention that the result

in Chasel would be exactly the same.

In othfer words, had the son of

Frank Chasel entered into a binding agreement with the other heirs for
distributing the estate, that agreement woul<£l be binding regarding
those heirs regardless of whether a will was subsequently found before
formal approval of the settlement agreement ifiad been made.

This con-

clusion is supported by the case of In Re Estate of Thompson, 601 P.2d
1105 (Kan. 1979) .

In that case an heir enteired into a family settle-

ment agreement because he was unable to findj a will of the decedent
and was fearful that if the will were not found he would recover
nothing under the law of intestate succession.
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Accordingly, he entered

into an agreement with the other heirs and on July 17, 19 75, he was
appointed as Executor of the estate.

The following day the original

will was found and he immediately sought to vacate the settlement
agreement.

The court, in rejecting the heir's contention that the

family settlement agreement should have been set aside, stated:
The original of the will has since been found. The
District Court concluded that the family settlement should
be set aside on the basis of mutual mistake of fact. We
disagree. In entering into the settlement the parties knew
that the original will had not yet been found. They could
not know what had happened to it; it might have been destroyed,
by testator, or someone else, intentionally or unintentionally.
It might still have existed, yet been permanently lost, or it
might have still turned up. It was the intention of the
parties to accept the consequences of the uncertainty. The
possibility the original will might be found was a risk
appellee accepted when he entered into the settlement. The
fact that now, with full benefit of hindsight, he would not
agree to the settlement is no basis for setting it aside.
Id. at 1110.
The cases cited by Appellants are not inconsistent with the statutory scheme established by the Utah Legislature.

It is clearly justi-

fied in some cases to require the court's approval of agreements before
they can be officially binding upon the parties.

In each instance the

Legislature had elected to classify certain groups, such as minors,
employees, class members, etc., as deserving of this protection.

In

the probate field this same reasoning applies as to all parties who
are "unborn, unascertained or who could not be located."
U.C.A.

§75-3-1101,

Until the court has approved the Family Settlement Agreement,

any heirs who claim an interest in an estate but who are not parties
to the agreement would not be bound by such agreement.

On the other

hand, the Legislature, by adopting the Model Probate Code and §75-3-912,
has clearly approved the practice of allowing competent heirs to contractually bind themselves as to the distribution of estate assets.
It did not intend to allow these individuals to escape these contrac-46-

tual obligations on the basis of two other sections of the code
which were not directed to these individuals.
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was correct in
concluding that the failure to obtain court approval did not allow
the plaintiffs an opportunity to repudiate the Family Settlement Agreement with immunity and they were therefore bound by its written terms.
B.

Assuming Arguendo That Plaintiffs ^ere Entitled
to Repudiate the Agreement Prior to Court Approval,
The Plaintiffs are Nevertheless Equitably Foreclosed
From Such Repudiation.

The lower court entered the following Conclusions of Law relating
to the conduct of the plaintiffs:
5. Following the execution of the Family Settlement
Agreement the parties acted in conformity therewith for
a period of approximately twenty months during which time
the plaintiffs received certain benefits and the defendants
made changes in position to their detriment in reliance
upon the provisions of the Family Settlement Agreement.
6. If the plaintiffs had grounds to set the Family
Settlement Agreement aside at the time 0f its execution,
which the court concludes they did not, such grounds were
waived by the subsequent conduct of the plaintiffs.
7. If the plaintiffs had grounds to set the Family
Settlement Agreement aside at the time d>f its execution,
which the court concludes they did not, Plaintiffs have
ratified and affirmed the Family Settlement Agreement. CR. 1232.
As noted above, the lower court found that the plaintiffs were
legally bound by the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement and that
the failure of the court to approve it prior to the repudiation did
not allow the plaintiffs an avenue of escape.

Even if it is assumed

that this conclusion is incorrect, the plaintiffs still should not be
allowed to repudiate the terms of the Agreement.

The facts in this

case as found by the lower court and as supported by the evidence
give rise to a number of equitable doctrines which prohibit Plaintiffs
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from repudiating the Family Settlement Agreement.

As stated by

one authority:
Even if a compromise and settlement is invalid or
defective, a party seeking relief from it may not be
entitled to a judicial remedy. Waiver, estoppel,
ratification and adoption are among the grounds which
may preclude a party from challenging validity of a
compromise and settlement and from obtaining judicial
relief. 15 A. Am. Jur.2d §44, p. 816.
These equitable doctrines clearly are applicable to the facts
of this case.

The following events illustrate the reasons why equity

cannot allow the repudiation of this Agreement.
1. After the Family Settlement Agreement was
signed, the plaintiffs and defendants jointly provided
representatives to the intestate proceeding in the
Philippines. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 261). They jointly
hired accountants and lawyers for the Philippine estate.
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 298). They jointly hired the Rand
law firm ti litigate the U.S. tax case. (Maxine Grimm,
TRA 319).
2. All of the heirs agreed to the distribution of
assets between the U.S. Tax Return (DX-2 72) and the
Philippine Tax Return (DX-239).
3. All of the heirs agreed that Maxine should be
allowed to draw $3,000 per month as her widow's allowance in the Tooele County probate proceeding.
(DX 229).
4. In May of 19 79 the Everett Steamship contract
payment was distributed, with $400,000 going to Maxine
and $100,000 going to each of the children. The next
two years she retained the entire payment. (Maxine
Grimm, TRA 358; TRB 765).
5. In September of 19 79 all of the parties contributed
to payment of the Philippine Estate Tax. (Maxine Grimm,
TRA 371). Ethel and Rex Roberts paid out of their own
personal funds 225,000 pesos or over $30,000 on behalf of
the estate.
6. Because of the agreement between the parties,
Mr. Salisbury was able to utilize the maximum marital
deduction and to allocate the various assets according
to the best tax advantages. (David Salisbury, TRB 137,
141). The Philippine estate specifically excluded the
two major assets of the estate, Globe Investment Company
and the Everett Steamship receivable, to the clear detriment of Juanita Morris and Ethel Roberts. (DX-239).
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7. With the use of the Family Settlement Agreement,
the separate Supplemental Agreement, and the inter vivos
trust the lawyers and accountants were able to use the
highest flexibility in reporting the estate to the various
jurisdictions. (David Salisbury, TRB 151; Pete Grimm,
TRB 564).
8. Maxine Grimm was able to borrow $500,000 from
the Globe Investment Company at a favorable interest rate.
(Lavar Tate, TRB 6 70-71) .
The preceding events occurred because the disputes between family
members had been settled by the Agreement.

it is obvious that the

estate and the plaintiffs received substantial benefits from these
events which otherwise may not have been received had an ongoing
dispute been in existence.

There is no question, for example, that

substantial savings in estate taxes were achieved by the placement
of the major assets under the U.S. return and not under the Philippine
return.
Report).

(Compare DX-272, U.S. Tax Return wiij:h DX-239, Philippine Tax
While this was a clear benefit to

estate and to the

plaintiffs, it was a clear detriment to the defendants, since their
strongest claim to any estate assets came und^r the terms of the
Philippine will; and, by eliminating the majority of the assets from
the Philippine jurisdiction, the defendants tthereby were substantially
prejudiced in any claim they could assert.
The defendants1 payment of approximately $30,000 for the Philippine estate taxes was also a detriment to their position if Plaintiffs1
claim that the Agreement was not binding is sustained.

In addition,

the heirs provided a united front in their negotiation with the
Parsons family, which maintained a 50 percent interest in many of
the jointly-owned companies.

(Pete Grimm, TfcB 579). To the defendants,

however, this seriously weakened their position, since they originally
considered Parsons as a potential ally in any battle against the
plaintiffs.
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As will be discussed infra, the additional benefits to the estate
during this period of time consisted of the original consideration for
the Agreement, including family harmony, absence of litigation regarding the validity of the inter vivos trust, litigation as to the
domicile and distribution of assets of the decedent, litigation as
to the validity of the marriage and divorce of the decedent, and
questions concerning tax practices of the decedent, as well as several
other claims.

While the absence of litigation, for example, constitute

the initial consideration for the Agreement, it continued on as a benefit up until the time that the present dispute began some two and a
half years later.
The preceding conduct, resulting in various benefits and detriments to the parties, justifies the imposition of several equitable
doctrines.

It can be said that the actions of the plaintiffs ratified

any deficiency existing in the Agreement, since they obviously accepted
the benefits

of the contract after becoming aware of the claims they

are now asserting.

15 A. C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement, §40, p. 264

§42, p. 269.
It is fundamental that any right to repudiate the contract can
be waived by the parties.

The plaintiffs can easily be said to have

waived their right of repudiation by taking advantage of the two-year
period for the benefit of the estate and thereby relinquishing any
valid claim they would have had.

See American Savings & Loan Assn. v.

Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah 1968); Lichtensbein v. Lichtenstein,
454 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1972); Prude v. Lewis, 430 P.2d 754 (N.M. 1968).
Even more applicable is the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
This Court has defined equitable estoppel as involving an admission
or statement or act inconsistent with a claim afterwards asserted;
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where the other party acts on faith of such Admission, statement or
act; and injury to the other party results from allowing the first
party to repudiate such admission, statement or act.

Celebrity Club,

Inc. v. Utah Liquor Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979); Blackhurst
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985).

The Kansas

Supreme Court in an earlier case applied the doctrine of estoppel to
a family settlement agreement.

The court th^re stated:

It has been held that, where the widow and each
of the children make a division of the estate satisfactorily to themselves in which all parties concerned
have acquiesced and retain the shares so alloted for
a long period of years, they will be estopped from
thereafter objecting to the arrangement]
The parties to such an arrangementiwould be
forever equitably estopped from disturbing it, as
amongst themselves, upon the most familiar principles
of justice. . . . Family arrangements ^re favorites
of the law, and when fairly made are never allowed to
be disturbed by the parties, or any oth^r for them.
Riffe v. Walton, 182 Pac. 640, 642 (Kan. 1919).
See also, Hughes v. Betenbough, 373 P.2d 318 (Kf.M. 1962).

(Horton

changed his position during his lifetime in Reliance upon the contract
and the appellants should therefore now be eitopped to deny the
validity of the agreement).
These cases illustrate that courts of equity will utilize whatever means are necessary to prevent unjust enrichment by one party at
the expense of another when the first party has performed in good
faith the agreement.

In Morris v. Leverett, 434 P.2d 912 (Okla. 1967)

there was no written family settlement agreement introduced into evidence.

The court found, however, that the defendant had induced other

relatives to forego a will contest by promising to divide the estate
equally with them and refused to enter into a written agreement because
of various excuses.

After distribution of the estate to him he denied

such agreement existed and attempted to rely upon lack of consideration
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and the parole evidence rule.

The court held that equity would not

permit him to gain the advantage by such acts, but would treat the
property which he acquired as being closed under a constructive trust
for the benefit of the other parties.
The present case is no different.

Equity will not allow the

plaintiffs to repudiate the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement
after the defendants for over two years had relied upon it, had compromised their various legal positions and monetary positions because
of it, and had made every effort to comply with its terms.

Quite

simply put, the plaintiffs cannot "have their cake and eat it too."
Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to ally themselves with the defendants
during the initial two years of probate and tax audits for the purpose
of increasing the assets of the estate and then, after the rough
waters have subsided, claim the benefit of all of the assets.

"Equity

will not allow a party to wait until another has improved property so
that it becomes valuable before asserting an equitable claim."
Williams v. International Assn. of Machinists, 4 84 F. Supp. 917, 920
(D. Fla. 1978).
Finally, a settlement agreement cannot be rescinded even for
cases of fraud or misrepresentation when there is no possibility to
put the parties in their original position.

Id. at 920.

As noted by

another authority, "Where the parties cannot be placed in status quo,
relief will ordinarily be denied, as where the rights of third persons
have intervened."
26 7.

15 A. C.J.S., Compromise and Settlement, §41, p.

There is no conceivable way that the parties here could ever

be restored to their pre-settlement positions.
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE ALLEGED SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DID NOT
AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT OR THE ABILITY OF THE COlllRT TO
APPROVE IT.
Appellants in their Brief maintain that the existence of the
"Trust Agreement" created by the decedent prior to his death (PX-11)
precludes the Family Settlement Agreement frdm affecting the assets
and terms of that trust.

(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 43-47).

Appellants

cite several cases from other jurisdictions as well as the Sundquist
case from this Court.

The Appellants conclude that "the court should

have rejected the FSA because it terminated and materially modified
Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust."

(Appellants' Brief, p. 45).

The authorities cited by Plaintiffs are in accordance with the
general rule of law applying to trusts.
these cases or authorities.

Respondents do not dispute

However, a review of these decisions and

authorities show that they are inapplicable to the present situation
for the following reasons:

(1) the trust in this case is merely

illusionary, and in any case, contains few assets; (s) plaintiffs have
renounced any interest in the trust and are estopped from now utilizing
it to avoid the FSA; (3) Section 75-3-1101, U.C.A. specifically allows
family settlement agreements to be binding even if they affect a
trust or inalienable interest; (f) regardless of the validity of the
trust or the statutory probate scheme, it wa£ in the best interests of
the beneficiaries to enter into the Family Settlement Agreement.
These arguments will now be discussed ^n serium.
A.

The Inter Vivos Trust is Merely Illusory
and in Any Case Contains Few Assets^.

The trust executed in this case by the decedent is testamentary
and illusory in character.

It grants no present vested interest in
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the beneficiaries at the time that it was signed and gives them a
vested interest only upon the death of the decedent.

In Alexander v.

Zions Savings Bank & Trust Co., 273 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954) this Court
was presented with a similar purported inter vivos trust which stated
that the interest of the beneficiaries did not vest until after the
settlorfs death.

This Court stated that "such declaration and intent

makes the trust testamentary in character and thus inoperative.

For

us to otherwise hold would be to render impotent altogether the
Statute of Wills."

Id. at 174.

Even if the trust is valid it contains few assets.

The lower

court made the following finding:
It is questionable if the assignment (of various stocks)
were in fact properly delivered to the trustee because Pete
testified that he placed the assignments in his Dad f s safety
deposit box which was in the name of E. M. Grimm.
[Pete Grimm,
TRB 541]. In October or November of 1977 but prior to Grimm's
death, Maxine took the contents out of Grimm's safety deposit
box and placed the contents in a safety deposit box in her
name. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 223-225; Pete Grimm, TRB 542].
It was not until after the death of Grimm that she placed
the trustee's name on the box. Pete wrote on November 14,
1977, "Before transferring them (stocks) I think we should
get their (Kirton, McConkie) opinion" (DX-302).
[Pete Grimm,
TRB 544-547].
(CR 1250, Finding No. 17).
If the trust res is a stock certificate representing shares in a
corporation, the method of transfer into a trust is to endorse the
certificate to the trustee and deliver it to him.

Delivery is an

absolute essential element for the validity of the trust.

Bogart

on Trusts states the general rule:
If the trust res is a stock certificate representing
shares in a corporation, the normal method of transfer is
to endorse the certificate to the trustee and deliver it
to him. Section 32, at p. 107.
Delivery is absolutely essential to the trust or the trust fails.
Under Utah Code Annotated, §70A-8-30 9, endorsement of any stock certificate or purchase thereby is not enough.
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There must also be delivery.

The statute states:
An endorsement of the security whether special or
in blank does not constitute a transfer until delivery
of the security on which it appears or, if the endorsement is on a separate document, until delivery of both
the document and the security.
While new stock certificates were prepared by Globe Investment
Company naming E. M. Grimm II as Trustee, the stock records themselves
do not show or reveal that E. M. Grimm II actually took receipt and
delivery of said stock certificates from the trustor.

(PX-12).

Finally, to create a valid "Spendthrift Trust" the beneficiary
must only be able to receive the income—not the corpus.
Southern Michigan Bank, 238 N.W. 284 (Mich. 1931).

Rose v.

Here Maxine could

receive all of the assets if she needed them for her needs.
For these reasons, therefore, there was no valid trust in existence at the time the Family Settlement Agreement was executed.
B.

Assuming Arguendo That There is a Valid Trust,
Plaintiffs Have Nevertheless Renounced Any
Interest in it and Are Estopped Frcpm Claiming
Under It.

Since the death of Edward Grimm, the plaintiffs have in no
manner acted as though any assets of the estate were in trust property.
Distributions have been made from the estate.

The wills have been

probated in Utah as though there were no trust agreement in existence
and there is no evidence that the plaintiffs in this case ever accepted
their interest in the trust assets.
Under Utah Code Annotated, §75-2-801, beneficiaries to a purported
trust can clearly renounce their interest even in cases where there is
a spendthrift provision.

The statute states, in part:

(b) The right to renounce exists Notwithstanding
any limitation on the interest of the person renouncing
in the nature of a spendthrift provisiori or similar
restriction.
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(c) A renunciation or a written waiver of the
right to renounce is binding upon the person renouncing
or person waiving and all persons claiming through or
under him.
It has been to the advantage of the plaintiffs to treat the
assets allegedly contained in the trust as if they were part of the
estate for tax and other purposes.

Equitable doctrines will not now

allow them after this usage to come back and claim that the assets
were all the time held in a trust made for their benefit.
C.

Assuming Arguendo That There is a Valid Trust With
Assets, Section 75-3-1101, U.C.A. Makes a Compromise
Family Settlement Agreement Binding Upon the Parties
Even if it Affects a Trust or Inalienable Interest.

Historically, courts have frequently given effect to agreements
made for the purpose of resolving pending litigation but which have
terminated spendthrift trusts.

This has been true both in litigation

involving the validity of the trust itself and in controversies
involving other matters.

See In Re Hansen, 533 A.2d 834 (N.J. Sup.

1981); Third National Bank v. Schribner, 370 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1963)
and In Re Duttonfs Estate, 79 N.W.2d 608 (Mich. 1956).

Such actions

have been approved even in the absence of any express statutory authority

empowering the court to terminate the spendthrift trust.
In Utah, however, courts have been given specific statutory

authority to validate and enforce settlement agreements which alter or
entirely destroy spendthrift trusts.

The provisions of Utah Code

Annotated §75-3-1101 have been referred to by one text author as a
specific example of "legislation permitting a court to terminate a
spendthrift trust. . . . "

Bogart, Trusts and Trustees, §226, p. 490.

The Utah statute specifically states, '"An approved compromise is
binding even though it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest."
Clearly, whatever rules were previously applicable to the termination
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of trusts involving spendthrift clauses have been altered by the
enactment of this statutory authority.

It should be observed that

none of the cases relied upon by the appellants in their Brief concern
interpretation of similar statutory language•
For these reasons, the lower court was correct in rejecting
the argument that the Family Settlement Agreement was somehow impaired
by the existence of the Trust Agreement.
D.

Even if it is Assumed Arguendo That There is A
Valid Trust, That the Trust Contains Assets, and
That it Can Only be Terminated for the Best Interests
of the Beneficiaries, Such Interest Exists in This
Case.

Appellants in their Brief have noted the position taken by the
Restatement (2d) of Trusts concerning the termination of a trust
agreement.

Section 337 states:

(1) Except as stated in subsectioi) (2) , if all
of the beneficiaries of a trust consent and none or
them is under an incapacity, they can compel the
termination of the trust.
(2) If the continuance of the trust is necessary
to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the
beneficiaries cannot compel its termination.
The comment to this section states that before a trust can be terminated
the court must approve any agreement and determine that it is in the
best interests of the beneficiary.

The comment then continues:

The mere fact that the interests of the beneficiaries
is not transferrable by him does not preclude the court
from approving a compromise under which he surrenders a
patt of his interest under the trust, since otherwise if
a contest were successful his interest might be destroyed
altogether. So also, the court can approve a compromise
although the beneficiary is an infant or insane person
or otherwise under an incapacity. Comment 0, p. 166.
Defendants do not believe that the statutory scheme in Utah
requires that termination be conditioned upon a showing of the "best
interests of the beneficiaries."

But even if it did such would be
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the case here.

Appellants, of course, contend that it was not in

their best interest to terminate the trust since the defendants had
no bona fide claim that jeopardized their interest and essentially
only derived the benefit through means of blackmail and duress.
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 46-47).

This conclusion is refuted by the

Findings of the lower court as well as the evidence which clearly shows
that material disputes existed and that it was in the best interest of
all the beneficiaries to resolve them without litigation.

The dis-

cussion as to whether these claims were "bona fide11 or not will occur
infra.
In addition, there is nothing inconsistent with the terms of the
Family Settlement Agreement and the terms of the trust established by
Grimm.

The Trust Agreement itself empowers Pete, as Trustee, to exer-

cise complete discretion in distributing the res of the trust to his
mother Maxine as he feels advisable.

Mrs. Grimm, as beneficiary, is

free to make whatever agreement she chooses regarding the disposition
of trust assets which the trustee transfers to her.

See Smith v. Smith

253 N.W.2d 143 (Minn. 1977); Mirot v. Mirot, 6 N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 1946);
Restatement of Trusts 2d, §152, Comment J.

Therefore, the Family

Settlement Agreement can easily be interpreted as an agreement
whereby the trustee vests the entirety of the trust estate in Maxine
Grimm, who simultaneously agrees to a plan for distribution of the
estate.
Appellants1 contention that the Family Settlement Agreement is
somehow radically inconsistent with Mr. Grimm's intent is incorrect.
Unlike many trusts, the one in question in this action has no definite
terms, such as for the life of the person to be supported, but allows
the trustee to convey the entirety of the trust property anytime he
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deems it advisable to do so.

As such, Maxinefs position and ability

to control the assets was extremely similar under both the trust and
the Family Settlement Agreement.
Certainly, any purpose in establishing the trust was for the
protection of Maxine and to make sure that she was taken care of
during her lifetime.

The terms of the Family Settlement Agreement

insuring that she receive the two properties plus a minimum of $1.5
million certainly assures this purpose.
For these reasons, therefore, the mere existence of the trust
agreement does not affect the validity of the Family Settlement
Agreement or the decision of the court to abide by it.
POINT III
PROPER NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO NECESSARY PARTIES
PURSUANT TO SECTION 75-3-1102 (c) AND THEREFORE
APPROVAL OF THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS
PROPER.
As noted by Appellants the lower court iround that all interested
persons had received notice as required by Section 75-3-1102(c).
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 47-48; CR 1233).

Appellants complain,

however, that this finding is in error since there is no evidence
that either Charles Parsons or Byron S. Huie received notice.

Because

of this alleged failure this Court is asked to reverse the lower
court's judgment approving the Family Settlement Agreement.

(Appel-

lants1 Brief, p. 48).
The argument raised by Appellants in Section C of their Brief
is an excellent example of other arguments raised throughout their
Brief.

There is no doubt, for example, that notice is required under

the statute to all "interested persons."
not disagree with this requirment.
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Respondents certainly do

However, as is the case throughout

their Brief, the facts developed in the litigation do not support
the legal argument being made.

The argument concerning notice is

perhaps the easiest of all to refute to show that these cited legal
principles or requirements either do not apply to the facts of this
case or have been completely satisfied by the facts of this case.
The entire argument advanced by Appellants assumes that Charles
Parsons and Byron S. Huie "were appointed with Maxine as Co-Executors
of the Philippine Will."

To support this c]aim Appellants cite

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7 at page 5.

This exhibit is the so-called

"Philippine Will" and paragraph 11 appoints Charles Parsons, Byron
Huie, and Maxine Grimm as Co-Executors of the will.

When this cita-

tion is examined, however, in light of the other evidence in the case
it becomes apparent that the alleged factual statement is incorrect.
While it is true that Mr. Grimm requested in his will that these
individuals be appointed as co-executors, such request did not in
fact make them executors.
The Philippine proceeding was handled as an intestate matter with
Maxine, Pete and Ethel being appointed as joint administrators of the
estate.

(Maxine Grimm, TRA 261). The Philippine will was not admitted

in that proceeding.

Instead, the Philippine will as well as the U.S.

will were both filed in Tooele County along with a codicil and by
stipluation of all the parties Maxine Grimm and Lavar Tate were
appointed as personal representatives for both wills.

(PR 54-50; PR

60-57; Lavar Tate, TRB 667).
Thus, there is no need to address the question as to what would
occur if executors were not properly notified as to the proceedings
surrounding a family settlement agreement since in this case the
facts show that both executors were parties to all proceedings.
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While

this alleged claimed error is extremely easy to refute since it is
based upon the simple fact of appointment of executors other claims
throughout the Brief are equally unsupported but cannot be so easily
shown.

It is for this reason that Respondents urge the court to care-

fully examine the facts of this case as viewed from the Respondents1
position before deciding whether the legal principles proclaimed by
the Appellants are applicable to the circumstances of this case.
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY
TRIAL ON INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF SEVERE
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, DURESS AND FAILURE OF
CONSIDERATION.
Appellants complain that they were deprived the right of a jury
trial as to the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress
based upon their 11th Cause of Action in the civil case (Appellants1
Brief, pp. 48-52), and were entitled to a jury trial on their defense
of duress and failure of consideration relating to the counterclaim
filed by the respondents seeking damages for breach of contract.
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 52-54).

In order to simplify discussion of

this issue the second contention of the appellants will be addressed
first.
On August 10, 198 3 Defendants filed a counterclaim contending
that the Family Settlement Agreement was completely valid and
enforceable and that the plaintiffs Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm had
violated the terms of the Agreement thereby giving rise to a breach
of contract action.

Defendants sought damages in the amount of $10

million for such breach plus a reasonable attorneys1 fee.
1632).

(PR 16 38-

On July 29, 1985 the plaintiffs filed their Amended Reply to

Counterclaim.

(CR 948-942) .

They essentially claimed as part of
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their defenses that the Family Settlement Agreement (the document
from which the claimed breaches occurred) had been entered as a
result of duress and was without consideration.

(CR 942) .

At the conclusion of the trial the lower court found in favor
of the defendants and against plaintiffs.

It found that the Family

Settlement Agreement was a valid document, could not be repudiated
by the plaintiffs, and could be enforced according to its terms.
If the Agreement had not been specifically enforceable, Defendants
could have had the right to proceed upon their counterclaim asking
for damages as a result of the breaches allegedly committed by the
plaintiffs.

Had Defendants so proceeded, then, of course, Plaintiffs

would have been

entitled to assert their legal defenses and the

entire matter would have been heard before the impaneled jury.
The lower court in the hearing prior to trial described how this
procedure would work.

The court stated:

Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a jury
trial, but so that everybody understands, the Court will
make the decision as to whether or not the Family Settlement Agreement is valid or invalid, and then based upon
that you may proceed on your countercl aim—you may not
proceed, but at that time the plaintiffs here cannot say
they did not have the right for the jury to hear all
of the defenses with regard to coercion, duress and
other defenses. That's the way the Court is going to
handle this.
(Tr. July 26, July 30, 1985 hearings, p. 23).
Plaintiffs have taken the novel approach of arguing that they
have been deprived of a jury trial because the defendants were not
required to proceed on their breach of contract counterclaim.

In

other words, Plaintiffs are asserting that they had a legal right to
a trial so that they could assert their affirmative defenses.

Such

an argument is contrary to both logic and civil procedure.
This conclusion can best be seen by taking the following hypothetical example.

Assume that "X" sues "Y" for a breach of contract
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alleging damages.

"Y" answers by stating that the contract is

invalid for a number of reasons.
against "Y".

"x" decides to dismiss the lawsuit

"Y" has no right (nor would he have any desire) to

require that the trial proceed so that he could assert his affirmative defenses.
Plaintiffs in this case filed their initial Complaint on the
basis that the contract was void because of the various reasons
listed in the numerous causes of action including duress and failure
of consideration.
basis.

They sought rescission of the contract on this

Rescission is clearly an equitable remedy and the lower court

found against them.

They cannot now complain that because the defen-

dants elected not to proceed upon their breach of contract counterclaim that they have somehow been deprived of a jury right to assert
their affirmative defenses.
The analysis concerning their claim for intentional infliction of
emotional harm requires a different analysis.

No reversible error

occurred as to this issue because of the following:

(1) under

Philippine law there is no cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional harm and therefore the action was not properly before the
court; (2) if a cause of action did exist under Utah law, the court
determined as a matter of law that the evidence did not state a claim;
(3) the plaintiffs were not entitled as a matter of right to have a
jury decide this issue and the lower court found in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs on the merits; (4) in the alternative, if Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination as to
this issue, then they have waived it by failing to make proper objection.

These matters will now be discussed.
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A.

Under Philippine Law There is No Cause of Action
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm and
Therefore the Action Was Not Properly Before the
Court.

Under Utah Choice of Law Rules governing causes of action
sounding in tort, the law to be applied is the law of the state
where the acts constituting the alleged tort occurred.
Maddison, 175 P.2d 118, 122 (Utah 1947).

Buhler v.

In the instant case, the

alleged tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress took
place in the Philippines and therefore Philippine law must apply.
The Philippines do not recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress without attendant physical
injury.

Philippine Civil Code §2219 provides that moral damages may

be recovered for torts causing physical injuries.

Thus, emotional

distress inflicted without attendant physical injury directly provable
to the alleged wrongful acts cannot be claimed in the Philippines.
See generally J. Sangco Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 513-528
(1973).

Plaintiffs failed to allege in their Complaint that the pur-

ported outrageous conduct of the defendants caused actual physical
injury to the plaintiffs.

(CR 72).

In addition, there was no evidence

introduced at trial establishing physical injury as a result of the
alleged conduct of the defendants.

For these reasons, therefore,

under Philippine law the lower court was correct in concluding that
no cause of action existed and in finding in favor of the defendants.
B.

If Utah Law is Applicable, The Court Determined as
a Matter of Law That the Evidence Did Not State a
Claim.

At the conclusion of Defendants1 case Defendants1 counsel moved
for a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Direct a Verdict as to Plaintiffs1 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
1119).

(TRB

The Court stated during that same proceeding that it found
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in favor of the defendants on all issues.

(TRB 1121).

While admit-

tedly there has been no specific finding entered by the lower court
to this effect the intent of the lower court can be ascertained from
the trial transcript and from the Judgment entered against the plaintiff
This Court on a number of occasions has concluded, as a matter of
law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has not
been stated or proved.

In Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449 (Utah 1972)

this Court held that the conduct of a woman towards a man who ultimately
killed himself did not give rise to a claim even though her conduct
had caused him great mental anguish and he repeatedly threatened to
kill himself.

See also, Covert v. Kennecott Corp., 461 P.2d 466 (Utah

1969) (Summary Judgment aff f d.); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982) (Summary Judgment aff f d.).
In addition, the Federal District Court of Utah on two occasions
applying Utah law has also found no cause of action existed as a matter
of law.

In Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp.

791 (D. Utah 1984) the court dismissed a cause of action claiming that
employees of the Mormon Church had suffered great humiliation because
of inquiries and practices relating to the religious beliefs and
actions of the employees.

The court after reviewing this Courtfs

decision of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) stated the
following:
Regardless of how the court feels about the appropriateness of the defendant's conduct and, even though
the plaintiffs may have been embarrassed, distressed and
humiliated, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that
the defendant's conduct does not rise to the level of
"outrageous and intolerable conduct" contemplated by the
Utah Supreme Court. Id. at 8 31.
In Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982) the court
found that the conduct of the defendants was privileged at the time
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that the occurrences complained about by the plaintiffs occurred.
This privilege nullified any outrageous or extreme conduct committed
by the defendants.
The Restatement of Torts 2d §46 is the foundation for this cause
of action in Utah.

Comment j discusses the type of severe distress

which is required.

It states:

The rule stated in this Section applies only where
the emotional distress has in fact resulted, and where
it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various
names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or
nervous shock or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only when it is extreme that
the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is
seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of
transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of
the price of living among people. The law intervenes
only when the distress inflicted is so severe that no
reasonable man would be expected to endure it. (Emphasis
added).
Comment h to the Restatement mandates that it is for the court to
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct
may reasonably be regarded as to extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery.

Comment g states that "the actor is never liable, for

example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal
rights in a permissible way.

Even though he is well aware that such

insistence is certain to cause emotional distress."

Courts in other

jurisdictions have dismissed cases as a matter of law involving
conduct similar to that alleged by the plaintiffs.
In Hassing v. Wortman, 333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983) the plaintiff
and defendant were married for over thirty years.

They obtained a

divorce in 19 77 and for over three years the plaintiff claimed her
husband continued to harrass her even after she had remarried.

The

lower court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff but the Supreme
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Court of Nebraska reversed.

The court held that although the harrass-

ment caused the plaintiff to be embarrassed and humiliated and had
resulted in her crying, losing sleep, and consulting a psychiatrist,
she had not shown that her distress was so severe that no reasonable
person could have been expected to endure it 4
In Whiehe v. Kukl, 592 P.2d 860 (Kan. 1979) the court held there
as a matter of law that the conduct of the defendant on several
occasions in verbal profane outbursts together with an assault by
brandishing a pitchfork against the plaintiff was not the type of
reckless conduct giving rise to a claim.
Several courts have specifically held that efforts to enforce
legal rights or to assert legal claims do not give rise, as a matter
of law, to a cause of action.

Wade v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 455 F.

Supp. 147 (D. Mo. 1978); Batchelor v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 547 F.
Supp. 1480 (D. Mich. 1983); Nestlerode v. Federal Ins. Co., 414
N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. App. Div. 1979); Thompson v. Sikov, 490 A.2d
472 (Pa. Super. 1985).
Even taking the allegations most favorably to the plaintiffs as
they have done in their Brief (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 50-51) there are
still not sufficient facts to allow this cas^ to be submitted to a
fact finder.

While this no doubt involved a very emotional dispute

between family members over a large sum of money a legal cause of
action does not exist.

Even under Plaintiffs1 version of the facts

Defendants were always asserting a claimed legal and moral right to
an inheritance and while such conduct no doubt caused grief among
all of the parties the tort has not been created for the purpose of
allowing family members to sue other family members as a result of
family financial disputes.
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For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was correct in
concluding as a matter of law that no cause of action existed as to
this claim.
C.

The Plaintiffs Were Not Entitled as a Matter of
Right to Have a Jury Decide This Issue and the
Lower Court Found in Favor of the Defendants and
Against the Plaintiffs on the Merits.

Plaintiffs maintained in the lower court that they were entitled
to a jury determination as to their 11th Cause of Action for emotional
distress.

It should be observed that the entire nature of Plaintiffs1

Complaint was one for repudiation or rescission of the Family Settlement Agreement or, in the alternative, for damages resulting from it.
Plaintiffs acknowledged that they could not plead both damages and
rescission and that they would have to elect remedies at the time of
trial.

(CR 164-165).

They obviously elected to seek repudiation and

rescission of the Family Settlement Agreement rather than damages.
Thus, the only claim which was unrelated to the validity of the
Family Settlement Agreement was the 11th Cause of Action seeking damages
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This cause of action was independent and separate from the
entry of the Family Settlement Agreement.

It could have been brought

separately at any time with no equitable issues at all being involved.
Instead, however, Plaintiffs chose to integrate this cause of action
with their equitable claims and as such cannot now claim a right to
a jury trial.

This Court in Colman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 731 (Utah

1981) held that where the issues presented are entirely or predominantl
equitable in nature, a litigant is not entitled to a trial by a jury
as a matter of right.
(Utah 19 74).

See also, Bradshaw v., Kershaw, 529 P.2d 803

The International Harvester Credit case cited by

Appellants in their Brief (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 48, 50, 53) is not
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to the contrary.

In that case this Court concluded that since

Plaintiffs1 Complaint was seeking money damages it was clearly an
action at law and was entitled to a jury trial.

In dictum the Court

observed that litigants had a right to a jur^ trial on legal claims
raised in conjunction with equitable issues.

This Court did not

discuss the Colman case cited just months before nor did it discuss
the situation here where a legal claim is completely separate and
apart from the equitable claims being asserted.

Defendants submit that

the facts and circumstances of this case preclude the 11th Cause of
Action from being a jury question.

An annotation collecting cases

throughout the country dealing with these types of circumstances states
the following:
In the absence of a statute or rule of procedure
dictating a contrary holding, the great weight of authority
has always been to the effect that the inter-position by
the defendant in an equitable action of a counterclaim of
a legal nature gives him no right to a jury trial, either
of the case generally or of the issue raised by the counterclaim. Having elected to assert in equity--as he was certainly
not bound to d o — a legal counterclaim, the defendant has been
held to have elected to have submitted $11 of the issues raised
in the action to trial in accord with the rules of equity
procedure. 17 A.L.R.3d 1321, 1327.
In Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 419 A.2d 167 (Pa. Super. 1980) a
former wife initiated an action in equity against her former husband
alleging that he had not complied with various terms of a property
settlement, support and custody agreement.
relief.

She sought equitable

The ex-husband filed a counterclaim alleging that the wife

had not vacated the marital residence contrary to the terms of the
agreement, asked enforcement of the agreement, and also sought damages.
The court held that where a litigant chooses to initiate an action in
equity he has assented to have all matters arising out of the occurrence
or transaction decided by the equity court and therefore has waived
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his right to jury trial with respect to the case in chief or any
properly maintained counterclaim.

Likewise a defendant who files a

legal counterclaim to an equitable action, rather than asserting it
as a separate action at law, has waived any right to have issues of
fact thus raised tried by a jury.
Thus, the emotional distress claim of Plaintiffs, assuming that
it stated a valid cause of action, was not properly triable before a
jury and the lower court was empowered to decide the case on its
merits if it was not previously dismissed as a matter of law.

Again,

while the Findings do not specifically address the intentional infliction

claim per se they do address the underlying facts.

The court

found, for example, that Maxine was not deprived of her free will durin
the negotiation period, that the plaintiffs were not put in such fear
as to overcome their free will or to compel them to act against their
will, and that they did not use duress, coercion, or fraud against the
plaintiffs.

(Findings 65, 66 and 67). In addition, many of the

factual findings state that the defendants were acting within their
rights and were attempting to peaceably exist with the plaintiffs
in spite of their differences as to their legal rights.
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court did not err in
failing to submit this matter to a jury and properly concluded that
the evidence was in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs
as to this claim.
D

*

In the Alternative, if Plaintiffs Were Entitled to
a Jury Determination as to This Issue Then They
Waived it by Failing to Make Proper Objection.

Even if it is assumed for the purposes of argument that the
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination as to their 11th
Cause of Action the record is clear that they waived any such right.
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On August 16, 1985 at the conclusion of the trial motions were made
by both sides in the chambers of the Court.

At that time the Court

announced that it was going to rule on behalf of the defendants as
to all issues.

It then asked the parties how they wanted to proceed

as to the defendants' claim of attorneys1 fees.

(TRB 1121).

A

discussion then occurred among counsel as to how the attorneys' fee
question should be handled.

(TRB 1122-24).

The court then adjourned

and reconvened in open court before the jury.

At that time it ex-

plained its decision to the jury, thanked them for their services,
and complimented the various sides.

(TRB 1125-27).

At no time during the in-chambers proceedings or in the open court
proceedings did Plaintiffs' counsel object that the jury was entitled
to decide the emotional distress issue.

Had he done so the court could

have addressed the question at that time wit& the jury still sitting.
By raising it during this appeal Plaintiffs are now seeking a new trial
which will necessarily require the recalling of numerous witnesses some
of whom reside out of the country.
A party must make an objection at the time of submission or
lack of submission as to whether an issue legal or equitable and
cannot wait until appeal to make such argument.

First National Bank

of Oregon v. Porter, 608 P.2d 598 (Ore. App. 1980).

It is, of course,

fundamental that appellate courts will not review a ground of
objection not urged in the lower court and that counsel must give
the trial court the opportunity to correct a claimed error before
asking the appellate court to reverse a decision and require a new
trial.

Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620

(Utah 1964).

See also, Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah

1986); Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980).
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Thus, the failure of the plaintiffs' counsel to timely object
to the jury submission issue constitutes a waiver of that issue and
cannot now be raised on appeal.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE EVIDENCE
IN THIS CASE TO THE CORRECT STANDARD IN CONCLUDING
THAT THERE WAS ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION EXCHANGED
BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEREBY CREATING A BINDING
FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in both its legal
standard of determining consideration for the Family Settlement Agreement and as to its application of the facts to that standard.
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 54-64).

The standard to be applied in

determining consideration of family settlement agreements is one of
first impression in Utah.

Neither party has been able to find any

Utah cases dealing with this subject.

It is therefore critical to

discuss the conflicting standards utilized throughout the country in
order to allow this Court the opportunity to decide which standard
it wishes to adopt.

The cases and authorities cited by Appellants

in their Brief take the hard-line approach that the compromise of a
claim is only valid if the claim itself can be shown to be "bona fide"
and have "merit" and it matters not the beliefs of the individual
asserting the claim or the beliefs of the individual the claim is
being asserted against.
The second, and what Respondents believe to be the most rational
approach is that a claim which is asserted in "good faith" by an heir
constitutes sufficient consideration even if ultimately the claim is
shown to have no merit and to be completely worthless.

As will be

discussed, courts consider this adequate consideration because the
controversy itself is being settled regardless of the ultimate outcome
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of the various claims.
The evidence in this case supports eithfer standard.

Defendants

will show that these claims were asserted in "good faith" under the
lesser standard of proof and will also show that the claims were
"bona fide" using the higher standard.

These standards and the

evidence in this case will now be discussed.
A.

This Court Should Adopt the Standard That Adequate
Consideration is Shown in a Family Settlement Agreement if the Forebearing Party Has a Reasonable Belief
That He Has a Ground For Opposing the Other Heirs and
That He Forebears The Exercise of His Right Because
of the Family Settlement Agreement.

The lower court entered a number of Findings concerning the
consideration question although not necessarily in chronological
order.

The Court stated:

65B. Defendants in good faith believed that the
claims they asserted regarding possible invalidity of
the trust, possible invalidity of Grimmfs divorce and
effect of application of Philippine law were legitimate
claims. The claims were of such merit that Mr. Salisbury
researched the issues and advised Maxine and Pete accordingly.
65C. Defendants did not know that the claims they
asserted were unfounded. It is not necessary to find
whether they were or were not unfounded.
69. With more specific reference to the claim of lack
or failure of consideration the Court finds:
A.

Mutual forebearance to prosecute claims;

B. Mutual promises for the sake of family
harmony constitute consideration;
C. Both sides of the controversy recieved
benefits from the Family Settlement. Litigation
was avoided (until repudiation) expense was minimized
(until repudiation). The parties were united in
dealing with taxing authorities and with the Parsons.
Maxine received the residences. Maxine received a
minimum guarantee. Maxine got her share free of tax.
Philippine estate tax was reduced by making it unnecessary for Ethel and Nita to claim entire estate, except
for real estate in Daggett County subject to distribution
(and taxation) under law of the Philippines.
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70D. The contest or controversy was and is in good
faith and the effect of the agreement upon the interests
of persons affected is just and reasonable.
Conclusion No. 3: The Family Settlement Agreement
is supported by good and sufficient consideration and is
a valid and binding agreement.
Conclusion No. 4: Following the
Family Settlement Agreement there was
consideration or breach of the Family
ment by Ethel or Nita or Juanita. (CR

execution of the
no failure of
Settlement Agree1236-1233) .

The lower court adopted the "good faith" position utilized by
many courts and authorities throughout the United States.

Appellants

have relied upon a contrary line of cases utilizing the "bona fide"
reasoning.

It is unnecessary to explain it further since Appellants

have adequately discussed it in their Brief.

(Appellants1 Brief, pp.

54-58) .
The general "good faith doctrine" applicable to any compromise
agreement is stated as follows:
If doubts expressed by the parties are based upon
good faith, and if it is agreed to resolve those doubts
by means of compromising the claim, the fact that judicial
developments or other sources of knowledge may subsequently
reveal to the parties that the claim was unfounded will not
justify invalidating the compromise. The validity of a
compromise is not impaired by the fact that the compromise
resolved issues differently than a court might have.
If a compromise is based on a claim asserted in good
faith, the compromise agreement will not be regarded as void
for lack of consideration merely because it ultimately
appears that the claim could not have been sustained at
law. This is so since if the right to compromise a claim
depended upon an ultimate judicial decision as to the validity
of the claim, a compromise, instead of being a means of
avoiding or ending litigation would be only an additional
complication in the progress of it; if the validity of a
compromise depended upon which party was actually right,
the very object of a compromise which the law favors—
avoiding the necessity of having a court resolve uncertainties—would be defeated. 15 A. Am. Jur. 2d §17, pp.
789-790.
(Emphasis added).
This general principle has been applied by a host of courts to
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family settlement agreements.

See cases listed at 29 A.L.R.3d 8,

at 91 and 29 A.L.R.3d 174, at 202.

See also Columbia Union National

Bank v. Bundschu, 641 S.W. 2d 864 (Mo. App. 1982); Howard
v. C.I.R., 447 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971); Morris v. Leverett, 434
P.2d 912 (Okla. 1967); Hughes v. Betenbough, 373 P.2d 318 (N.M. 1962);
and Weade v. Weade, 150 S.E. 238 (Va. 1929).

Some courts even go

further and hold that the mere agreement to settle a dispute between
members of a family is itself sufficient consideration regardless
of their good faith since it is important to have tranquility within
a family, prevent further litigation, and preserve family property.
Clark v. Clark, 288 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1979).
The application of the "good faith" doctrine is in line with
this Courtfs recent decision in the Matter of the Estate of Frank
Chasel, supra.

Basically that decision states that parties to a family

settlement agreement must take their chances as to future events and
cannot later reverse their positions because facts or legal conclusions have changed.

Under the appellants1 "bona fide" approach the

Chasel case would be decided differently since it would be determined
that an error had been made in concluding the will had been lost and
therefore there was no "bona fide" forebearance given at the time of
the agreement justifying adequate consideration.
Applying the two doctrines to this case also shows a clear
difference.

Under the "good faith" approach it is only necessary to

look at the parties and what they did at the time of the transaction.
For example, look at the letters and legal memoranda written by Mr.
Salisbury as to his concerns of the various claims being asserted.
To use the "bona fide" approach, however, requires the moving party
to bring in witnesses such as Mr. Benavince to argue as to whether the
claims and concerns of the parties at the time the agreement was
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entered into were reasonable and contained merit.

As noted earlier,

this in effect required a trial on the very issues the Family Settlement Agreement is designed to resolve.
In any event, whichever standard is adopted in Utah the evidence
in this case shows that both bona fide and reasonable claims were
asserted and that they were asserted in good faith by the parties.
This evidence will now be disoussed.
B.

The Evidence in This Case Justified the Lower
Court's Conclusion That Defendants Asserted
Good Faith Claims and Also Justifies the Finding
That There were Bona Fide Claims.

Before proceeding further, it should be noted that if any estate
case could ever be considered unpredictable and complex this is the
one.

The decedent left assets in Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the

United States.

He executed both a "U.S. Will"and a "Philippine Will".

He also executed a trust agreement.

His assets consisted of every-

thing from the usual real estate, stocks, bonds, and partnership
interests, to the unusual pig and pearl farms.

The decedent had

married twice, and had two children from each marriage, some living
in the United States and some living in the Philippines.

The decedent

himself was a resident of the United States but had lived for over
thirty years in the Philippines maintaining a home in Tooele.

All of

these facts certainly justified the conclusions by the various
attorneys who testified that this was a very complex and difficult
estate to settle and involved many difficult and complex questions.
Appellants argue that there was no evidence that the defendants
asserted valid claims at the time the Family Settlement Agreement
was being negotiated and then cite several areas of testimony by the
defendants.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 62-63).

Rather than explaining

how these statements were made in their correct context Defendants
-76-

shall merely state evidence in their favor which amply supports the
lower court's Findings.
1.

The Defendants Had a Bona Vide Claim Asserted in Good Faith

that Mr. Grimm's Divorce was Invalid.

Mr. Holbrook testified that in

his meeting with Mr. Salisbury the question of the validity of the
divorce came up.

There was a question of the decedent's divorce

being obtained in Nevada and the issue is whether or not under
Nevada law the residency had been properly obtained in order to make
the divorce valid.

(TRB 879). There was also a claim that a mis-

representation of the assets had been made at the time the divorce
was entered into.

(TRB 880). Mr. Salisbury was concerned enough

about this claim that he engaged a law firm in Reno to search the
records and render an opinion as to the validity of the 1947 divorce.
He stated that he considered the effect of the validity of the
marriage as one of the elements that would be resolved in an ultimate
settlement agreement.

He received a letter from Nevada counsel on

January 27, 1978 giving an opinion as to the validity of the divorce.
Rex Roberts testified that he met with a lawyer friend in Oregon
concerning the marriage and that this lawyer told him that it was
entirely possible that Maxine Grimm's marriage was not legal.
958).

(TRB

Mr. Roberts admitted that he told Mrsj Grimm and Pete Grimm on

at least one occasion each that he had questions as to her marriage.
(TRB 643-44).

He told them that if this wer^ the case Juanita Grimm

would have a 50% interest in the estate.

(Id.)

Mr. Merrill Norman, Plaintiffs1 accountant, testified that if the
marital deduction utilizing Maxine Grimm's marriage was not allowed
that the estate tax would go up considerably and that the family
would collectively become much poorer.
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(TRB 739). The preceding

outline shows that the question of the marriage was adequately
discussed at the time of the settlement and that the defendants
had a "reasonable belief" that the claim may have some validity.
As to the question of being "bona fide" the case of Plunket v.
Plunket, 283 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1955; holds that in order to obtain a
divorce in Nevada there must be a bona fide residence.

The case

of Brill v. Brill, 102 P.2d 523 (Cal. 1945) applies Nevada law and
indicates that under the Nevada code the plaintiff in an action for
divorce must have resided six weeks in the state before suit is
brought and that persons residing for the sole purpose of obtaining
a divorce were not bona fide residents for purposes of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The case of Howard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 447 F.2d
152 (5th Cir. 1971) concluded that a bona fide compromise claim existed
between an ex-wife and ex-husband concerning the validity of a divorce
which had occurred approximately twenty-one years before.
2.

The Defendants Had a Bona Fide Claim that Mr. Grimm's Trust

Was Invalid.

Mr. Holbrook testified that in his meeting with Mr.

Salisbury they discussed the validity of the inter vivos trust.

(TRB

877). He wrote to Mr. Roberts in a letter on April 6, 1978 (DX-308).
In the letter he relates all of the various issues involved in the
case including domicile, community property ramification, fraudulent
concealment of the marriage, laches, the validity of the irrevocable
trust and the validity of the transfers into the trust and the location
for domicile purposes of the assets.

Mr. Salisbury verified that Hol-

brook had claimed he would challenge the validity of the trust that
had been created in Utah and the circumstances surrounding the transfer of assets.

(TRB 118). A memo prepared in Salisbury's office
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questions the validity of the trust.

(DX-24^).

As to whether such claims were reasonable see the discussion
supra, Point II.
3.

The Defendants Had a Bona Fide Claim That They Were

Compulsory Heirs.

Once again, Appellants have quoted the evidence

most favorable to themselves and have ignored all the evidence which
disputes their contention.
by all parties:

During negotiations two facts were admitted

first, that Nita and Ethel were given an interest in

the "Philippine" estate under the terms of the Philippine will based
upon the law of legitime; second, the law of legitime established
a percentage of distribution for all heirs who came under it.

Mr.

Holbrook advised both Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Roberts concerning the
possibility of asserting a claim to the Philippine assets.
885).

(TRB 877,

In the letter to Mr. Roberts Mr. Holbrook states that he was

awaiting information from Roberts1 Philippine lawyers concerning the
issue.

(DX-308).

In the meantime Mr. Salisbury had discussed the inheritance
problem with Maxine and Pete in his office in January and pursuant to
that conversation initiated research in his office as to the legitime
and domicile questions.

(TRB 81-84).

An eight-page legal memorandum

discussed several issues including the validity of a trust connected
with more than one jurisdiction as well as the legitime principle
under Philippine law.

Later, he sent a telegram to Mr. Angara who had

been retained by Mrs. Grimm as her Philippine lawyer.

(DX-253).

The

six-page telegram extensively discusses various questions raised concerning domicile, legitime law, validity of trust provisions, and
the probate code.

The telegram concluded with the following:

There may be some merit after considering all of the
circumstances and discussing the matter with Mrs. Grimm to
try to work out some settlement with the two daughters by
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the prior marriage as to the percentage of the Philippine
estate in which they will be entitled to participate, particularly if the assets in the trust could be left intact.
A telegram sent by Mr. Angara to Mr. Salisbury discusses the
conflict of law rule in Utah and states that under the renvoi doctrine
it is possible that the Philippine estate would be probated in accordance with the Philippine law (including legitime) even if inconsistent
with Utah law.

(DX-253; Findings of Fact No. 34).

Mr. Salisbury admitted that under the legitime provisions there
were possibilities under various constructions that the defendants
could inherit assets in the Philippines.

A subsequent legal memorandum

(DX-255) prepared by a lawyer in Mr. Salisburyfs office concluded
that if Mr. Grimm was determined to have been domiciled in the
Philippines at the date of his death the Utah Probate Code would apply
the Philippine law of descent and distribution to all of his personal
property.

(TRB 109). Mr. Holbrook testified in later conversations

with Salisbury that Salisbury said it was in the best interests of
the estate to settle it quickly

and to have a single lawyer proceed

with the probate and the treatment of the tcix case and marshalling of
the assets.

(TRB 878). The above certainly indicates a "good faith"

claim on the part of the defendants as to their ability to inherit
under the Philippine law.

Since most of the assets in the estate

were of personal property including the Everett Steamship contract
and the Globe stock, it was possible that almost all of the estate
could wind up in the Philippines subject to the claims of Nita and
Ethel under the Philippine will.
The question as to whether the legitime interest in the Philippine estate is "bona fide" does not need to be answered at this point
since it is extremely complex and space limitation does not permit
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the required discussion.

It is useful, however, to note that the

Philippine lawyer who testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, Emilio
Benavince, was himself unable to venture an opinion as to whether
Nita and Ethel would have an interest under the Philippine will.
The question was asked by Plaintiffs1 counsel:
Q.

Under the non-Philippine will, would Ethel Grimm
Roberts and Juanita Grimm Morris be entitled to
receive anything under that will?

A.

I am sorry.

Q.

I am referring to the non-Philippihe will.

A.

I think that might be an easier relating to the
construction of this will. I am not prepared to
give an opinion on it. (TRB 372).

You are referring to-n-

In another discussion with defense counsel the witness was asked
whether if a person was domiciled in one country but a citizen of
another country would give rise to a question of conflict of laws.
He replied:
The question is a question that would require qualification. And if I were to say yes, the answer would be wrong.
If I were to say no, the answer would be as wrong. If you
want a wrong answer, I will give it to you. (TRB 387).
Defendants would refer this Court to the cross-examination of
Mr. Benavince by defense counsel as to the ipter relationship between
the legitime Philippine law, domicile, and the doctrine of renvoi.
(TRB 374-400).

In addition, the arguments of defense counsel to

the court concerning this issue also explains the position taken by
Defendants as to why a valid claim was being asserted under the
Philippine will.

(TRB 771-79).

The preceding discussion concerning the law of legitime illustrates why the

f,

bona fide" dispute approach is not satisfactory.

A

complex and difficult matter of law was presented to the lower court
to decide an issue which is in effect a hypothesis as to what would
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have happened had the parties continued to litigate.

The court is

thus being forced to make a declaratory judgment in order to determine the merits of the settlement agreement.

It is far better to

only examine the first portion of the question which is whether at
the time of the negotiations the parties believed a substantial
question existed even if the claim is later shown to be invalid.

In

any event, however, under either standard there is clear evidence
that the parties in this case were making good faith and bona fide
claims based upon the advice of attorneys and other professionals.
The very fact that the attorneys themselves believed it to be in
the best interests of all parties to settle the dispute obviously shows
that they believe there were some merits in them thereby certainly
verifying that consideration was being exchanged for the Family
Settlement Agreement.

Howard v. C.I.R., 447 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971).

In addition, the requirement of a "good faith controversy" required
by Section 75-3-1102 was certainly met.
POINT VI
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT COMPLIED WITH
RULE 52 U.R.C.P. AND PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BASIS
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
The last point urged by the appellants is that the lower court
findings contained omissions, half-truths and unsubstantiated conclusionary statements.
is needed here.

(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 64-73) .

Little comment

First, while there may be several "conclusionary

findings" contained near the end of the document there are obviously
numerous factual findings which provide the basis for such conclusions.
Each of the findings has been documented by the defendants to refer to
the transcript references and exhibit references supporting the statements .
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Second, while it would no doubt be ideal for the state trial
courts to be able to prepare their own findings of fact and conclusions
of law economic reality prevents this from occurring since to do so
a trial court would have to take many days away from the bench to
prepare findings in this type of complex and lengthy litigation.
There is no doubt, however, that the lower court was fully aware
of all of the arguments being made throughout the proceedings by
counsel and was carefully reviewing the legal arguments each night.
See e.g., TRB 809-824; 833-34; 844-52; 856; 1119-26.

This case

was not decided in a vacuum and the lower court knew exactly what
the issues were at the time the decision was made.
This Court has held that although findings should be made on all
material subordinate and ultimate factual issues, it is not necessary
that the court resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues and the
court is not required to negate allegations in its findings of fact.
Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159 (Utah 1980).

The majority of Plaintiffs

argument is their disagreement with the evidence as viewed by the court
and by the defendants.

Obviously, with a record of this size numerous

additional items could be quoted and other items could be omitted
depending upon the ultimate conclusion to be reached.

Here, the

conclusion was reached contrary to the Plaintiffs1 position as was the
prerogative of the court.

Plaintiffs cannot now cite those references

favorable to themselves and claim error as long as there is substantial
evidence to support the court's findings.

Moreover, these findings

should not be disturbed on appeal except to prevent manifest injustice.
Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); Jackson v. Jackson,
617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980).
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CROSS APPEAL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD DEFENDANTS
THE REASONABLE ATTORNEYS1 FEES INCURRED TO ENFORCE
THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
Defendants have cross appealed from the order of the lower court
entered April 29, 1986 denying Defendants1 claim for attorneys1 fees.
(CR 1271).

The Family Settlement Agreement provides:

In the event any legal action is required to
enforce or interpret the provisions of this Agreement,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all
costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys1 fees.
(Para. 14C, PX 58).
This Court has held that attorneys1 fees should be awarded for the
"successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of
[the] agreement."

Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).

As such, therefore, Defendants were entitled to be awarded the
reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in the enforcement of the Family
Settlement Agreement.
The decision of the lower court as to attorneys1 fees should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
The lower court was literally inundated with hundreds of exhibits,
many volumes of pleadings and many days of testimony.

The case is

replete with numerous legal issues some of international concern.

The

lower court after listening to the evidence concluded that the
plaintiffs were bound by the agreement they had voluntarily negotiated
over a two to three month period with the assistance of numerous
lawyers and other advisors.
The decision of the lower court was sound and is supportable
as has been previously stated through the various sections of this
Brief.

The decision enforcing the Family Settlement Agreement
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should be affirmed.

The lower court erred, however, in failing

to award attorneys1 fees to the defendants Who prevailed in their
claim under the Family Settlement Agreement and as to that order
it should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
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APPLICABLE STATUTES
75-3-912. Private agreements among successors to decedent
binding on personal representative.--Subject to the rights of
creditors and taxing authorities, competent successors may agree
among themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts to
which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under
the laws of .intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written
contract executed by all who are affected by its provisions. The
personal representative shall abide by the tbrms of the agreement,
subject to his obligation to administer the estate for the benefit
of creditors, to pay all taxes and costs of administration, and
to carry out the responsibilities of his office for the benefit of
any successors of the decedent who are not parties. Personal
representatives of decedents1 estate are not required to see to
the performance of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person
who is willing to accept the trust. Accordingly, trustees of a
testamentary trust are successors for the purposes of this section.
Nothing contained in this section relieves trustees of any duties
owed to beneficiaries of trusts.
75-3-1101. Effect of approval of agreements involving trusts,
inalienable interests, or interests of third persons.--A compromise
of any controversy as to admission to probata of any instrument
offered for formal probate as the will of a decedent, the construction,
validity, or effect of any probated will, the rights or interests in
the estate of the decedent, any successor, op the administration of
the estate, if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for that
purpose, is binding on all the parties thereto, including those
unborn, unascertained, or who could not be located. An approved
compromise is binding even though it may affect a trust or an
inalienable interest. A compromise does notj impair the rights of
creditors or of taxing authorities who are not parties to it.
75-3-1102.

Procedure for securing court approval of compromise.—

(1) The procedure for securing court approval of a compromise
is as follows:
(a) The terms of the compromise shall be "set forth in an agreement in writing which shall be executed by ajll competent persons
jnd parents acting for any minor child having beneficial interests or
having claims which will or may be affected by the compromise.
Execution is not required by any person whose identity cannot be
ascertained or whose whereabouts is unknown £nd cannot reasonably be
ascertained.
(b) Any interested person, including tjie personal representative
or a truee, then may submit the agreement to the court for its approval
and for execution by the personal representative, the trustee or
every affected testamentary trust, and other fiduciaries and representatives.
(c) After notice to all interested persons or their representatives, including the personal representative of the estate and all
affected trustees of trusts, the court, if it finds that the contest

or controversy is in good faith and that the effect of the agreement upon the interests of persons represented by fiduciaries
or other representatives is just and reasonable, may make an order
approving the agreement and directing all fiduciaries under its
supervision to execute the agreement. Minor children represented
only by their parents may be bound only if their parents join with
other competent persons in execution of the compromise. Upon
the making of the order and the execution of the agreement, all
further disposition of the estate is in accordance with the terms
of the agreement.

November 17, 1977

Dear K&xlne,
1 do not care to cause you additional problems at this
tine, but Nita and I decided while she was here that we would
wait for you to approach us as ycu indicated you would when you
asked us to trust you regarding our interests in our father's
estate.
However, it is obvious that you do not intend to include
us in your arrangements in as much as you have not mentioned the
subject since Nita left, and that you continue to conceal from us
your intentions and plans regarding his affairs, particularly with
regard to your hopefully obtaining a Vill from my father in the
future.
It is a shock to Kite and me to learn about your Trust
which I understand deliberately eliminates her completely and
includes me for US$10,000. Is this a fair and proper share of
my father's estate?
In order to evaluate this situation prior to taking legal
action I request that you furnish me with a copy of this Trust.
Also I want a list of all assets wherever, and to the best of your
knowledge a list of all known outstanding oblioations owino by his
•state. I would like to have this by Monday at the latest.
Maxine, I hope that we will be able to work out something
that will not involve court procedure. We both understand what
this will mean, but I can see that you are giving us no other
option.

Sincerely,

oooooi

Text of letter from Linda Grimm to Ethel Roberts:
December 2, 1977
From Hong Kong to San Francisco
Via PAA
Dear E^hel,
I wanted to write and thank you for all the help you gave
Mom and Dad while Dad was in the hospital, especially before I
came. I had intended to write you from Utah, but before I got a
chance to I was in Manila. I also v/ant to thank you for inviting
me over for lunch. I really enjoyed it- and the talk we had.
I asked Mom why she told you she knew nothing about a 1959 Will
after I had already told you I knew Pete had found one. She
actually didn't remember anything about it. So, I don't want you
to think she didn't want you to know about it. I think all the
pressure was building up. I wilL have Pete send you what info we
find as soon as we get things straightened around.
We're now on our way to San Francisco.
from Hong Kong.
Thanks again for your help.

Itfs an 11 hr. flight

I'll write you again from Utah.
Love, SGD Linda
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Dear Family of Roberts,

O
€2

Linda and I.arrived safely on Friday and .spent.the next day
selecting a very nice coffin* I wish .they had had one like that
In Manila* Earl and teVar really made *Grandpa l,ook very nice*
He was dressed In his Tesple clothing and lookecj very much at
peace—so much better than In Manila* Ve had the services on
Monday and people came from, far off* < The Church was full—the
same .as at Manila and there were very beautiful flowers* I ,
brought some to the house so they would not freeze and they are
still very fresh* The orchids tha^ I brought—ths florist, made
a beautiful spray for the casket and a basket which we put under
the picture that Jess had made—a very nice picture—I will bring
one for you If you like* Aleo we taped the services and I will
bring .It .so yon can hear It* Linda talked as In Manila• Bete and
his friend sang—I played for them* Everyone eald it* was the
nicest funeral they had ever attended* Cordon Hinckley, who Is
one of the Twelve Apostles $ spoke* Free* Wilkinson, who was
Free* of the BYU Is going to print the program up for us* I will
bring It also* Ares* Oakes of the BYU came to the funeral as
did Billy Casper and many very prominent people from around hersNlta and Bob and Mike and Janet and Krle came* I was so happy
that they did* Nlta and Kris stayed over night—I had hoped
that they could stay longer* Kris is radiant* I was so pleased tc
see her that way* Ve also found Carol In ths 9*F* airport and
had a good visit with her* She looked (rreat—radiant like Krle,
so I guess thsy are both very happy and that Is good** Ve were
so lucky to see Carol* VI Hader came over from Colorado*
There have been some very nice articlee written—Linda is going
to make a book with all of them plus pictures* I will enclose
one that was written* I might mention that the orchids are
still ftesh—I took some to my niece who is in the hospital and
aftrlendwho le dying of cancer*

^
;~
*^

I am mending this with my cousin who la Father of Valeria
Vhiehouse—you could send a letter back with them* I would
think that the post office is very confused at thia time*

I an sorry that we ar* not there for Chrlstnas. It had
looked ae If ' nijrht all have a very happy Ch itmas togetherone never know* what Is going to, happen these uwys.
Fste and I plan to cone to Manila after the first of the
year. When do you Intend to leave? Ve would like to get there
before that tine if possible.
Linda has gone back to work. They were oertainly
have her return.* Bate is taking final exanst I don't
he Is going to cone outf for he has been out of school
'least 2 weeks. He won't be able to graduate ae he has
quarter to go.

happy' to
know how
for at
one nore

Ve hope that you will all have the Best Christmas that is
possible. He are hoping w* night hAve a white Chrlstnas9 but so
far it is the weather is sunny and clear. Today it was 60 1 very
slid for this tine of year*
Marie. don't forget to send ne those measurements.
Thank you so nuch for taking care of everything.
appreciate your help.

I really

Love t o AH 9

1st

• - v I r-f |

• i r\ —»r- i*

December H , 1977

Deer Maxina,
I want to thank you and Linda for your niea lettars to us
all. I am sura you hava baan Tary buay vith tha funeral and
gat tine eattlad bafcra Chriatxnaa.
I hare baan tryina to halp Praesy gat thank you notas out
to paopla who helpad. Lattara of condolence ara atill caning in.
Va vill aava them for you ao you vill knew. Praairy alao put a
acta of thanks in tha nevspapar which ia tha cnatonary thing to
do hara. I thinfc all ia in ordar.
Lily callad up yastarday and aaid thara ver<* mar. diving undar
tha Lanikal ac Rax want ever to chaaa them off. Kov could anyona
&•% anything in that vatar, ouch laaa lira to tall of it? Sex
aaid ararrthincr alae is c.k.
Tha girla ara gatting vary axeitad about Christmas. Joanna
ia laaving tcmcrrcv with tha baby ao our house vill ba ouch quietar
vithout Paul. Mrs. V^rrin^ sends ua a big Christmas traa aach yaar
from Mindanao. Va ara vary lucky sinca it ia illagal to cut thea
on Luton.
About our problem, I am still rary such ccroerned. I am
veiling to hear hcv you plan to probata my father's estate, and
I hepa you are sanding Schedule A aa you promised. It vill ba
battar for ua all to aattla thia situation amicably.
I hopa you, Linda and Pata hava aa nice a Christmas aa you
can under tha ciifuaataneas. I knev you vill mlas my father Tary
such aa va shall loo. It still does not seem possible ha ia gone.
With loYe from us all.

December 15, 1977
Dear Maxme,
It seems hard for me to believe that it has been ten days since I
was with you in Utah. The empty feeling of losing Daddy is so
prevalent... I cannot believe that I can no longer tell him in
person of the great love I have always had fpr him.
I want you to know that I thought the services in Tooele were
lovely. The tremendous tributes paid to Daddy by your friends
there were over-whelming... the graciousness and thoughtful expressions of sympathy extended to me by so many of Daddy's friends
were so appreciated not only by me, but also by Bob, Mike and Janet.
We are all so appreciative of your generous pffer to bring us all
to Tooele*
My flight back to San Jose was a good one (and a funny one) * In
order to get a seat by myself I practically $at in the kitchen and they were training new personnel!. It was almost as good *as a
circfcs. The flight that Kris chose to return to SF was delayed for
over an hour...her poor Mike, probably thought he had lost his bride
forever!
I went up and saw Kris in her new apt. a few days after my return.
I am sure that after she gets it fixed up that it will be a decorator
showpiece. She has the knack of taking an old crate and making it
look like something out of the finest furniture shop. Their apt.
reminds me of Nana's house...small rooms, high ceilings, etc.
Remembering all the promises that we made to each other when I was
leaving Tooele, I am trying to live up to mine! I wrote notes of
thanks to both Norma and LaVar... and I thank again whoever it was
that returned LaVar's jeep to him. I hope that Pete has time to make
the cassette recording of the service for me. Or, if you would prefer,
would you send me a copy of Bro. Hinkley's speech. It was so nice.
I would like to hear Linda again... she was so wonderful, and what a
beautiful talent she has to get up and speak so well in front of a
f—• large group of people - especially at a time like that. I hope Maxine
I that you will send me a copy of Daddy's will very soon. You told me
I that^ Ethel and I were mentioned in it and it is very important to me
I to knew details at this time. Bob and I are in the midst of formulating
I new wills and trusts for ourselves and our lawyer asked me the other
I day if I had any interests outside of this country, and as I started
I to think over the matter I said quite possibly I would. Since we
I began this project last September we are most anxious to have it comI pie ted. Please let me know if there is anything I can do to help.
I have tried twice in person to get ahold of Elsa, and will continue.
Although she told me to call her, I question if she hears the telephone
for I have called early in the day and late' too. I understand that she
goes "out to lunch downtown" everyday. Apparently this is not done at
a conventional hour because the day that Carol and I were in SF she was
leaving for downtown and it was 3:00 in the afternoon. This is my last
week of Work before "having two weeks off for Christmas vacation and I
plan to go to SF next Tuesday, and will try again. If I do not catch
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-2her in person I shall leave a large note taped to her door.
shall be lucky and get a response!!!

Maybe I

I trust that Pete is back at school taking his finals and Linda back
at the gym in Salt Lake. I.enjoyed seeing them both so very much...
I wish that it had all happened during a happier time, but the short
time I had with each of them was delightful.
Did I tell you that our cabin had been broken into. Kris and Mike,
when they went there for their honeymoon, were greeted with no power
and a mess left by our uninvited visitors. Whoever the person(s) were,
went in and got very sick during their stay....consequently, Kris and
Mike brought me LOADS of washing to do. They of course didn't know all
that we had in the cabin so couldn't really tell if anything had Been
stolen. Bob and I went up over the weekend to finish cleaning up, repair leeks, nail things closed and take inventory. The only real theft
was the taking of all my first aid equipment, and because of the locatio
of the place I had everything for bee-stings, to slings, etc.. ••they eve
took my treasured bottle of Ute-sol! They completely went through every
drawer leaving them topsy-turvy, drank all our soft drinks, and shot 5
bullet holes in the ceiling (which of course went through the roof)....
Needless to say Robert is not too happy about that!!! This is the first
time I haven't been too mad about the drought - I don't want rain in
my house! - and, it's hard to repair a metal roof.
We did bring our usual load of Christmas trees home for ourselves, the
stores, the mothers, and a few special friends. I put up ours and it
is pretty. Tonight we are having Kris and Mike for dinner, for I guess
what you would call an early Christmas, since they will be heading back
to his folks place.
I must run for now... just wanted you to know that I am thinking of you
and hope that things are going a bit more smoothly. We have all been
over a pretty rough road lately... I am sure though that love and friend
can help, make it smoother. Thank you in advance for sending me tne will
and again thank you for your generousity in bringing us all to Utah.
The children are most grateful to have been able to have been there.
Please tell your caretaker's wife (Lynn?) that I delivered her gifts to
her parents. They were pleased to hear from her.
I am enclosing this letter in a card done by one of my former students..
needless to say, 1 am quite proud of her, and delighted to know that
maybe I was a small part of her success... I must admit however that
she was born with a tremendous talent!
Take good care of yourself Maxine, and do le't me hear from you soon.
Much love from all of us, J"""\

%

,

PS -rrl forgot to mention my new wooden tea set. . .1 have a.perfect place .
to display it in our new kitchen and it looks great! Thanks so much....
The tea set is the first pieces of the inlaid wooden ware that I have,
so I am truly delighted.
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l>ec»r Kaxlne*
Just a note to report on my trip t o San Francisco yesterday.•••
1 finally got to see Elsa. Z am c onvinced that she has been
at home the other times that Z ha^ a tried, but she simply canft
hear, (While Z vas there someone came to the door "and cranked
that bell*,,, itfe so loud Z thouc ht the vhole house vas going
to come dovn around us, and she d: dn9t even hear it! I 111), She
von9t have an extension put on he: telephone either $ so that is
still out in the front hall and s> a keeps the front part of the
house closed of f $ so there is litt le chance of getting ahold of
her. Finally the neighbors sav mj out in front of iher house
and came out to ask me vhat Z vant ed. After telling them vho
Z vas her one neighbor told me thz t she had a key to the house
and vould let me In. That is hov I finally got tocher. (Needless to say, Z have given my name *nd address to ttyat neighbor
and have ksked that they call me i f they ever suspect that anything Is vrong vlth her,) She vas delighted to se^me and ve
had a nice visit, Z took her a pcinsetta and she ifas delighted
to have •a Christmas thing*,,*., cily $ cards sat ^n too of the
table,,,, a very sad setting - the poinsetta helped I i.
Regarding the house• Slsa told me that C d H holds all of her
Pcpers (they apparently take very good care of their employees) ,.#
She told me that Nana had willed the house to her and that she
intum has villed it to Freda, anc thai Frank and MaryLou vill
get it. She says it is in her na*ef arid that she gets the tax
bill each year in her name, and she pays the taxes on it III
I didnot feel that Z could questioi her vord,

giving
Regarding the help that Daddy vas At&d/fM
her9 she also in can*
versation told me that she plans to return to Spain at least once
more - probably leaving after the first of the year,, and she vent
or, to tell me that she had a good income vlth plenty left-over for
travel • etc.
Z also vent to see Fred yesterday. Z alvays take blm a poinsetta
each year,,*, hevs alvays pleased and looks forvard tp it. He vas
just getting ready to be picked up by his lady friend ^vho vas taking
him to her house for dinner, Z stayed long enough )to mept har, and
traded names and addresses vlth her too. (The lady has. an Incredlb!
resemblance to Alice - short# short cropped vhite hair/ pleasant
face and engaging smile.) Z vould guess she is inlher early 60's * very active real estate salesvoman. Khile she vaa there Fred told
me that he guessed he should give me a key to his house so Z could
get in incase anything happened to him..••« she said;*You ehould gl\
me one toot19... Fred saidf "If Z give you one, you4,11 come in and ta
my chair t* - At that point Fred vfent in his room for a minute and sh
turned to me and said* "You knov honeyf if Z just get that chair 1*1
be happy I* She said this as she vas patting my arj* • Ididn f t comma
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-2I really felt that I had a good visit
delighted to have some insight on hov
1 think that ve are most fortunate to
health and vith no apparent financial

vith both of the-u and a*
to keep in touch Yith them,
have them both in good
needs*

1 trust you received mp letter of December 15th* Z am vatching
the mall box closely each day aval ting your ansverf
I assume that Kristine is back vith Mike's family by nov. She
vas to leave last Monday Z believe* Z received a Christmas card
from Mikefs mother In which she told me she vas giving a party
to introduce Kris to their friends • she is having 70 people in •
poor Kris - you know hov she hates crcvds!!!! Mike and Kris vere
down for dinner the other night*.•• It vas an -early Christmas* fc
them* Then last Sunday ve entertained Bob9s employees along vith
their spouses* girl/boy friends, etc* He had 45 here in our nev
•small* house***** it vas cozyI Bob doesnot believe in "store
parties" at the store, so ve do it at the house* Z think he is
right after reading for years about the harm that comes from offic
parties • but it is a chore! Thank goodness Jannie vas here to he
me*/» betveen Jannle and my microvave all vent veil, but Zvm exhau
Ve are planning a very quiet Christmas - just the grandmothers and
Bob9s sister vill be here for dinner on Christmas Day* Z still
have shopping to do9 and am trying to send out a fev Christmas car
to close friends* Z'm keeping busy! and, looking forvard to doing
very little the veek after Christmas!!!!!
Kaxine* please keep in touch and let me hear from you soor.* Also,
please let me knov about Daddyfs papers that Z asked ypu for*
Thanks again• and as Z said in my last letter* if there is anythin
Z can do to help just let me knov*
Regards to Pete and Linda* and rsuch lave to you all*
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November 10t 1978

Dear Maxine*
I was dismayed when you walked out on us during the
meeting yesterday morning* L can't understand what you are
trying to accomplish and whether you are truly sincere or not
when you say you are completing the accounting and will have
it finished by the time Salisbury gets here* And I can't unde
stand why any mention of accounting should upset you so much a
whey you should take it so personally when you are in fact dea
solely with Estate funds*
As you and Pete are the only ones with access to Estate
funds it is no more than natural that Nita and I would want to
know what is being disbursed and for what* We really have no
idea of what Santillan is doing either, aside from your personrecords • Further I think you are making a mistake trying to
use Santamaria stockbrokers as a bank* Estate funds must and
should be very well accounted for*
Pete told us you have not been feeling well and I hope
you are better today* Is there anything I can do? perhaps yoi
and Pete are trying to do too much yourselves when you should
be having much more professional help*

Sincerely*
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Text of letter from Maxine Grimm to Ethel Roberts, handwritten while
on Pan American Airways, December 2, 1977:
Dearest Ethel Please forgive me for blowing up - 1 was so ashamed. I hadn't
slept nor had I eaten and I was just not prepared to confront you.
I am especially sorry about what I said ctbout Linda being asked to
lunch. I didn't really believe that - Linda and I changed our plans
so she could go - I was especially happy for her to do so - maybe I
had wished I had been asked also.
I'm also sorry about all the mixup on the Will bit. I don't
really think I knew what I was saying. I'm still confused over it
so I shall wait until I get to Utah and write you from there.
Linda was sick with a high fever and we slept little - had to
find sweaters for warmth and now we are on a 747 straight for S.F.
- 11*5 hours. It is full as JAL was on strike and they put the
passengers on this flight.
I still do not have things in their proper perspective - it
will take some time, but I especially hope that we can keep the
girls from losing faith in their Grandfather. They had enough
qualms over their father - I would like to spare them any more.
I just hope we can be the best of friends. I plan to spend
more time in Manila and I really need your friendship and help.
If I have not returned before you leave, let us know your plans
Perhaps you could come to Utah?
I hope that from now on I won't have to say anything about
religion. Had I been doing instead of talking I would have been
better off. It is good that we can always change.
I never realized until yesterday the impact of your feeling
about disinheritance. I wish now I had insisted on knowing more.
You have already learned this lesson. If you recall, you were the
one to warn me.
I was so sure your Daddy would live to straighten out all the
problems. Perhaps he died so we could become big enough to solve
them ourselves. I am sure we can.
I left wheat, wheat germ and flour in the lower refrigerator.
Would you take out what you want. As I mentioned there will always
be plenty of duck eggs.
Thanks Ethel - I'll write after the funeral.
you may hear it sometime.

I'll tape it so

Thanks so much for your support during those trying days.
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(Signed)

Maxine
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May 4, 1978

Mr, Jose C. Florento
Price Waterhouse & Co.
8th Floor, Rufino Building
Ayala Avenue, Makati
Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Florento,
With reference to OUT Meeting this Morning, May 4, it is our understanding
that you and your firm would be willing to handle the accounting work that we
feel we need in order to settle the estate in the Philippines of the late
Edward Miller Grim, and that you will work with our attorneys in the Philippines
and whomever we May designate in the United States or elsewhere to coordinate
on Philippine related matters.
We understand that your fees will run from ?20 to P250. per hour, depending
on the personnel involved.
We would appreciate your billing us on a Monthly basis for all work
performed up to date, and we hope that we will be able to pay you as billed.
If this does not conform with your understanding please let us know,
otherwise we will consider that we will have your complete cooperation and
assistance in this matter.
If for any reason either party should decide to terminate this agreement
30 days notice will be required.
Very truly yours.
•C£

.•'.

L.

* •=

fc E C E 1 V E L
Marine Tate Grimm
/i

Ethel Grim Rofc*rtB
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Saturday, September 29
Dear Maxine,
I have been trying to reach you for several days and
have been unable to do so*
I am very concerned about the closure of the Santamaria
Brokerage Office which as you know occurred Monday of this week*
I can only assume from the fact that you have not contacted me
that all of the Estatefs stocks and/or deposits are intact, or
I would have heard from you*
However, I must insist
today, a complete accounting
which have been in your care
The accounting should include

that you furnish me immediately,
of all of the Philippine stock assets
and custody since my fatherfs death*
all dividends, cash and stock*

Also I want to see the stock certificates that you are
holding*
And please as I have requested before, I must again ask
you for the accounting files which I turned over to Pete and was
assured would be returned to me on request* I have had your
continual promise but no files*
I am still waiting
paper so I can return it
acknowledgement of taxes
paper for the IRS in the

for you to come by to sign the BIR
to the BIR for their signature and
paid* Attorney Salisbury needs this
United States*

Sincerely,

4*
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October 1f 1979
jjear i^thel,
I just received your letter of September 29th.
«KS to the filk papers which require my signature,
I shall appreciate it if you can send them to me.

I

will return them right «>way.
A S I understand it we have already paid the BIR
about JM.9 million, aside from the representation expenses
in the sum of r^OOT.
However, I received today a notice of assessment
dated September 7, 1979 for JM ,568t029«64f inquiring if
the estate has already paid said sum of money.

I then

need the BIR receipts so that I may fill out the BIR
form*
/is to the other things stated in your letter, we are
still wording on them,

since we shall soon have the actual

partition, all those other matters mentioned by you shall
be taken care of.
To complete my records, 1 also need copies of your
check and that issued by Atty. W. Limqueco, which checks
were both paid to the BIk.

Sincerely,
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SLB008{09?7^CXJ090022COA8^PD 0 2 / 1 7 / 7 8 0 9 5 7
XCS XPMIIHA-'USS— •
I I S S FM VUI 17 0557
PMS SALT LAKE CITY UT
UWB9392 HNV39S EHAU9
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MANILA VIA ETPI MNL 344 17 142 PART* PACE 1 / 6 4
DAVID E . SALISBURY
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY
1 4 2 EAST FIRST SOUTH
SALT U K E CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
MRS MAXINE TATE GRIMM HAS ENGAGED OUR SERVICES AS
COUNSEL TO HANDLE PHILIPPINE END IN THE SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE OF HER LATE HUSBAND, CERTAIN QUESTIONS NEED TO
BE RESOLVED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE HOW THE INTERESTS OF
THE ESTATE VILL BZ BEST AND MOST ECONOMICALLY SERVED

COL 141

2996

84111

PACE2/-70
<AA) THE DETERMINATION OF THE DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT
I S THE CRUCIAL THRESHHOLD QUESTION UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAV, THE CROSS ESTATE OF A DECEDENT DOMICILED IN THE
PHILIPPINES VILL INCLUDE ALL PROPERTY, REAL OR PERSONAL,
TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE; WHEREVER SITUATED, EXCEPT REAL
PROPERTY SITUATED OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE CASE OF
ONE NOT DOMICILED IN THE COUNTRY, INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
I S INCLUDED IN THE GROSS ESTATE ONLY IF SITUATED IN THE PHILIPPINES
COL

(AA>

PACEJ/S?
CONSIDERING THAT TK2 LATE MR. GRIMM WAS A RESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FOR MORE THAN FOUR DECADES AND THAT HE
t*~1tn

(MM!)

2991

HELD A PHILIPPINE PERMANENT RESIDENT VISA AT THE TIME OF
HIS DEATH, PHILIPPINE LAW WOULD CONSIDER HIM DOMICILED IN
THE COUNTRY. FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES, THE POSSESSION OF A
PERMANENT RESIDENT VISA IS CONSIDEREipJONCLUSlVE IN ESTABLISHING THE DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT IN THE PHILIPPINES
COL GRIMM
PACE4/M
(BB) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPAL CONSEQUENCES UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW FLOWING FROM THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT
WAS DOMICILED IN THE PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH)
tl) HIS WILL MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROGATE IN THE PHILIPPINES
t2> HIS CROSS ESTATE WILL INCLUDE tl) REAL PROPERTY LOCATED
IN THE PHILIPPINES: (III) INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
WHEREVER SITUATED.
•MM1

(KM*

<3> THE ESTATE TAX IS 6 0 / ON A NET ESTATE OF P E S 0 S 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
(APPROXIMATELY USDLRS*07,000.00 BASED ON THE CURRENT EXCHANGE
RATE OF USDLRSl.OO S PES0S7.37) OR ABOVE.
COL (BB) ( J ) ( 2 ) ( I ) t i l )
( I I I ) ( 3 ) 6 0 / PESOSJ,000,000 (USDLRS407,000.00
USDLRSJ.30 I-PESCC7.37)
PAGE5/52
PHILIPPINE LAW ONLY IMPOSES AN ESTATE TAXf INHERITANCE
TAXES WERE ELIMINATED IN A RECENT STATUTE (BUT THE RATES
OF THE ESTATE TAX WERE APPRECIABLY INCREASED).
( C O UPON THE OTHER HAND, ASSUMING THAT THF L«.TF MR.
CRZ"!* MICH? BE ' E l ? TO P p POIICILT !M ?*.LT L*>CE CITY,
THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAJOR CONSEQUENCES!
2$Sit
COL () (CO X
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SlB009{l90S$;iJi00218C04g^PD 02/17/78 1007
XCS IPMIIHA-IISS •* •
I I S S FN VUI 1 7 1 0 0 7
PMS SALT LAKE CITY UT
UWA7037 MNWW9 EHA119
UVNX CV PNMA 3 6 5
MANILA (VIA ETPI/MNL) 1 « 7 8 / 1 5 9 * 17 2 1 4 2 PAGES PART2
DAVID E . SALISBURY
VAN COTT, BACLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY
1 4 1 EAST FIRST SOUTH
SALT LAXE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
( 1 ) INTANGIBLE PROPERTY WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE CROSS ESTATE
ONLY I F LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
<2) NO ESTATE TAX SllAll B£ COLLECTED IN RESPECT OF
INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT IF <A>
US FEDERAL LAV OR UTAH LAW DOES N01 IMPOSE A TRANSFER TAX

300C

»M«01 (M-H)

m
Htfti

OR DEATH TAX OF ANY CHARACTER IN RESPECT OF INTANGIBLE
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF PHILIPPINE CITIZErJS(N^/RESIDIN6 IN UTAH, OR
COL (1) <2> (A)
PACE7/M/50
CB) I F US FEDERAL LAV OR UTAH LAV ALLOWS A SIMILAR
EXEMPTION FROM TRANSFER TAXES OR DEATH TAXES IN RESPECT OF
INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF PHILIPPINE C I T I Z E N S ( f i g ) RESIDING IN
UTAH. VJTK PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SHARES OF STOCK AND
BOOTS,(THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE CROSS ESTATE OF A NON-RESIDENT
COL <8>
PASS8/S9/S4
rTEcEl
CEDENT* REGARDLESS OF LOCATION A1 THE TINE OF DEATH IF
ISSUED
V ISSUI BY ANY ENTITY ORGANIZED OR CONSTITUTED IN THE PHILIPPINES
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS LAVS, OR IF ISSUED BY ANY FOREIGN

300;
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CORPORATION EIGHTY-FIVE PER CEUTUM OF TJC BUSINESS OF
WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES, OR IF SUCH SHARES OR
BONDS ISSUED BY A FOREIGN CORPORATION HAVE ACQUIRED A
BUSINESS SITUS IN THE PHILIPPINES.
PACE9/105/102
(CO QUERY* IS THERE ANY ADVANTAGE UNDER UTAH LAW FOR
PURPOSES OF THE ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAXES IF THE U T E
MR. CRItIM WOULD BE CONSIDERED DOMICILED IN UTAH AT THE
TIME OF HIS PEATHt
<DD) THE PROBATE OF THE WILL EXECUTED BY THE LATE
MR. GRIMM PERTAINING TO HIS PHILIPPINE PROPERTIES (PHILIPPINE
WILL, FOR SHORT) DOES NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE DONE IN
THE PHILIPPINES. THE PHILIPPINE WILL MAY BE PROBATED
ELSEWHERE. IF THE WILL IS PROBATED ABROAD, PHILIPPINE LAW
(M»1 (M-W)

PROVIDES AN EXPEDITIOUS PROCEDURE FOIi T.IZ ALLOWANCE OF A WILL
ALREADY PROBATED OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE ESTATE THEREUNDER.
COL (CO <DD)
PACE 10/72/65
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, COMPEL IN OUR OPINION
PROBATE OF THE PHILIPPINE WILL IN THE PHILIPPINES, TO UITl
<1> THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE DECEDENT IN THE PHILIPPINE
WILL WHICH CONTEMPLATES PROBATE THEREOF IN THE PHILIPPINES AS
MAY BE GLEANED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE ELEVENTH PARAGRAPH
OF THE WILL DESIGNATING THE EXECUTORS QUOTE FOR THE PURPOSE
CF ITS PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES UNQUOTE.

COL (i)

3003

NNN
t * 1 K 1 (RMW
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DAVID E. SALISBURY
VAN COTT, BACLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY
141 EAST FIRST SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITT, UTAH 84111
(2) TWO OF THE EXECUTORS NAMED IN THE PHILIPPINE WILL,
CHARLES PARSONS AND BYRON S. KUIE, ARE RESIDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
(3) THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE MILL ARE
ALL LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(4) MRS. ETHEL CRIMM ROBERTS, ONE OF THE DAUGHTERS OF
THE DECEDENT FROM HIS FIRST MARRIAGE, HAS ALREADY COMMENCE!'
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS IN A PHILIPPINE COURT. UNDER PREVAILING
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE, THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE
OF THE PHILIPPINE WILL SHOULD BE FILED IN THE SAME COURT.
COL (2) (3> (4)
PAGE12/98/92
(EE) A PROBATE OF THE PHILIPPINE WILL IN THE
PHILIPPINES, HOWEVER, VILL ENTAIL AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN
AND EXPENSE FOR THE ESTATE ARISING FROM THE FOLLOWING I
(1) CONSIDERING THAT THE PHILIPPINE WILL WAS EXECUTED IN
SAN FRANCISCO AND THE RULE UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW THAT THE
FORMS AND SOLEMNITIES OF WILLS ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAVS
OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE EXECUTED, COHPLIIANCE WITH
•*iai (RMD

000024

THE REQUIREMENTS OF CALIFORNIA LAW ON THE FORMALITIES
REQUIRED IN RESPECT OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE WILl
MUST BE SATISFACTORILY PROVED IN THE PHILIPPINE PROBATE COl'ST.
COL (EE) ( 1 )
PACEl3/73/«7
( 2 ) SINCE THE TVO ATTESTING WITNESSES ARE BOTH RESIDENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, THEY WILL HAVE TO TESTIFY PERSONALLY
BEFORE THE PHILIPPINE COURT OR THEIR DEPOSITIONS MUST BE
TAKEN IN THE UNITED STATES. ~"
( F F ) A SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCE OF THE PROBATE OF THE
PHILIPPINE WILL IN THE PHILIPPINES IS THE APPLICATION OF TH£
UW OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN DETERMINING THE INTRINSIC VALIMTY
OF THE TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS.
COL <2> (FF)
•*1«1

(NMt)

PAGEU/97/**
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAV, THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION, THE
AMOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS AND THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY
OF THE TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS ARE REGULATED BY THE NATIONAL LAW
OF THE DECEDENT, WHATEVER MAY BE THE NATURE
OF THE PROPERTY AND REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTRY WHEREIN SAID
PROPERTY MAY BE FOUND. WITH RESPECT TO AN AMERICAN CITI2EN, THE
APPLICABLE LAW WILL BE THAT OF THE STATE WHERE HE IS A
CITI2EN. IN THE CASE OF THE LATE MR. GRIMM,
WE ASSUME THAT HE WAS A CITI2EN OF THE STATE OF UTAH AT THF
TIME OF THIS DEATH.
NNN
NNNN

3007
•*1»

(*Mt)

SLA020CU07X1«»11138$C04S)PD 0 2 / 1 7 / 7 8 1 1 0 7
ICS IPHIIHB I I S S
I I S S FN WUI 17 1 1 0 7
PMS SALT U K E CITY UT
UVB935C MNV40! EHA119
UVNX CV PNMA 3 8 9
MANILA VIA ETPI/MNL 3 « 9 17 2 1 4 2 P 1 5 / « 5 / « 2 PART*
DAVID E . SALISBURY
VAN COTT, BASLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY
M l EAST FIRST SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, THEREFORE, THE UTAH LAW ON THE
ORDER OF SUCCESSION AND THE AMOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL IICHTS,
PARTICULARLY WHETHER UTAH LAV RECOCNIZES COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY BETWEEN SPOUSES AND WHETHER THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
AND THE CHILDREN ARE CONSIDERED COMPULSORY HEIRS AND,
•F-1M1 (MM«|

IF S O , THE AMOUNT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SUCCESSIONAL RICHTS CR
WHAT -IS KNOWN IN CIVIL LAV AS COMPULSORY LEGITIMES.
PACE1«/133/123
(GG) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PHILIPPINE WILL
PROVIDES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE IN ACCORDANCE VITH
PHILIPPINE LAW, THIS GOES AGAINST THE RULE UNDER PHILIPPINE
U V THAT T I E NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT GOVERN* THE
ORDER OF SUCCESSION, THE AHOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS AND THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS. HENCE,
THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS PROVIDING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE LAV IN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF THE ESTATE MAY BE RENDERED INOPERATIVE I F INCONSISTENT VITH UTAH
U V FOLLOWING A DECISION OF THE PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT TH4T
A PROVISION IN A FOREIGNER'S WILL TO THE EFFECT THAT HIS
3<
•ft-IMI (M-W)
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PROPERTIES SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PHILIPPIIE
LAW AND NOT WITH HIS NATIONAL LAV I S ILLEGAL AND VOID FOR HIS
NATIONAL LAW CANNOT BE IGNORED.
COL ( C O
PAGE17/88/85
PLEASE ADVISE US, THEREFORE, VHETHER THE DISPOSITIONS
HADE BY THE DECEDENT IN HIS PHILIPPINE WILL IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PHILIPPINE LAW ARE CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW,
(RH> WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW FROM YOU VHETHER THERE IS
A CONFLICT OF LAW RULE IN UTAH PROVIDING THAT THE LAW OF THE
DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT SHALL GOVERN SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS.
IF THERE IS SUCH A RULE, AND THE PHILIPPINES IS HELD TO BE
THE DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH,
THE PHILIPPINE COURTS WILL ACCEPT THE RENVOI OR THE
W.1J01 (NM»

REFERENCE BACK TO PHILIPPINE U W , IN VHICH CASE THE TESTAMFXTARY
DISPOSITIONS OF THE LATE MR. GRIMM
IN MIS PHILIPPINE VILL IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PHILIPPINE U W EVEN IF INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH
LAW WILL BE VALID AND OPERATIVE.
COL (HH>
PAGElB/101/97
(II) WE NOW TURN TO THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE TRUST
AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE LATE MR. GRIMM.
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW, PROPERTIES TRANSFERRED TO A TRUST
WHERE THE TRUSTOR RETAINS THE POWER TO REVOKE ARE INCLUDED
AS PART OF THE GROSS ESTATE IN DETERMINING THE NIT ESTATE SUBJECT
TO ESTATE TAX. FURTHERMORE, SUCH TRUST PROPERTIES ARE
SUBJECT TO COLLATION IN DETERMINING THE

000027

COMPULSORY LEGITIMES OF THE HEIRS. THUS, IF THE TRANSFER
IN TRUST AFFECTS THE LEGITIMES OF THE HEIRS, SUCH TRANSFER
SHALL BE ACCORDINGLY REDUCED} OTHERWISE, THE PROPERTIES HELD
BY THE TRUSTEE WILL BE LEFT INTACT,
COL ( I I )
NNN
NNNN

3012

SLA012<i023)(l«»i00543G048>PD 0 2 / 1 7 / 7 8 1024
ICS IPMIIHA IISS
2ISS FM VUI 17 1024
PMS SALT LAKE CITY UT
UVE34C4 HNV402 EHA119
UVNX CV PNMA 2 1 0
MANILA (VIA ETPI/MNL) 1 8 7 8 / 1 5 9 $ 17 2 1 4 2 PAGE19/48 PARTS
DAVID E . SALISBURY
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY
141 EAST FIRST SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
QUERY! IS UTAH LAW THE SAME AS PHILIPPINE LAV IN THE
TREATMENT OF PROPERTIES TRANSFERRED PURSUANT TO A REVOCABLF
TRUST FOR PURPOSES OF ESTATE TAXATION AND COLLATION?
PLEASE NOTE THAT UNDER THE TRUST AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE
DECEDENT THE GOVERNING LAV IS THAT OF THE STATE OF UTAH*
wwai mm

301.
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PAGE20/89/S7
FOR YOUR INFORMATION, PHILIPPINE LAW ADOPTS THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE GENERAL LAWS ON TRUSTS AS DEVELOPED BY
AMRICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND OUR SUPREME COURT HAS
SELIED ON AMERICAN PRECEDENTS IN CASES INVOLVING QUESTIONS ON TRUST.
< J J ) WE INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE CODICIL TO THE LAST
WILLS AND TESTAMENTS OF THE LATE MR. CRIMM. PLEASE
NOTE THAT THE EXACT SAY OF EXECUTION IN JANUARY 1 9 6 6 I S
NOT INDICATED. WE SUGGEST THAT MR. KINS EXECUTE AN
AFFIDAVIT WITH RESPECT TO THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION
OF THE SAID CODICIL.
COL ( J J ) 1 9 6 6
PAGE21/73/71
OQ<
WE SHALL APPRECIATE A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
•*um (MMti

PHILIPPINE LAW REQUIRES DELIVERY OF A WILL TO THE COURT BY THE
EXECUTOR NAMED IN THE WILL WITHIN TWENTY DAYS AFTER HE KNOV3 OF
THE DEATH OF THE TESTATOR OR AFTER HE KNOWS OF HIS APPOINTMENT
I F HE OBTAINED SUCH KNOWLEDGE AFTER THE DEATH OF
THE TESTATOR, THE NAMED EXECUTOR IS SUBJECT TO
A FINE FOR ANY INEXCUSABLE DELAY.
ESGARDO J . ANGARA
NNN
NNNN
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February 24, 1978
CABLE ADDRESS;
ACRALAW, PHILIPPINES
Telex: RCA 7222374
Eastern 3 622 PN
TO: EDGARDO J. ANGARA
122 GAMBOA STREET
LEGASPI, MAKATI
METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES
Re your cable of February 24, 1978, I will call you at 1645
hours (Utah time) on February 24, but will not have had an
opportunity to do further research in reply to your cable
just received.
David E. Salisbury
SF-1201 (HMD
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CABLE ADDRESS:
February 21, 1978
ACRALAW, PHILIPPINES11
Telex: RCA 7222374
Eastern 3 622 PN
EDGARDO J. ANGARA
ANGARA, ABELLO, CONCEPCION, REGALA & CRUZ
122 GAMBOA STREET
LEGASPI, MAKATI
METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES
Your cable of February 17, 1978 was received by us on Friday, February
We are pleased that you have agreed to represent Mrs. Grimm and the est
of her late husband. I will endeavor to answer the questions raised by
your cable, making reference to your lettering system. After receiving
this if you feel a telephone conference would be advisable, please cabl
a suitable time.
(AA) I agree that the domicile of the decedent is the crucial threshol
question which we must resolve. I am inclined to agree that it will be
difficult, if not impossible, to establish his domicile as being other
than in the Philippines, particularly in view of the information in you
cable concerning the conclusive presumption where a permanent resident
visa is held.
(BB) The consequences under Philippine law flowing from a domicile in
the Philippines is substantially the same as the conclusion would be
in the United States if he were domiciled here. My biggest concern is
the tax rate in the Philippines and whether or not there will be any
difference in ability to negotiate the amount of the gross estate in th<
Philippines as compared with the United States.
(CC) Even assuming a U. S. domicile it would appear to be your conclus:
under (CC) that the Philippine gross estate will still include a
substantial portion of the Grimm estate because of the provisions relating to stocks and bonds of Philippine corporations.
WU 1211 (**-*»)
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Page 2 of 6
With respect to the U. S. law (and any Utah tax is based upon the Feder
tax determination) the following situation would apply to a Philippine
citizen and domicile who died a resident of Utah: Stock would only
be taxed if issued by domestic U. S. corporation and debt obligations
would be taxed only if issued by U. S. person, corporation or State or
Federal governmental agency. Funds in U. S. banks and U. S. insurance
companies would be taxed here including funds in a domestic branch of
a foreign bank but excluding funds in foreign branches of U. S. banks.
I am sure you are also familiar with the credit for foreign death
taxes allowed a U. S. citizen for taxes paid to a foreign jurisdiction.
This credit is set forth in Section 2014 of the Internal Revenue Code
and related sections.
With respect to your query under (CC) concerning the advantage of a
Utah domicile at the time of death, the principal advantage would be
that on an estate of $407,000 with at least one-half of the estate
passing to the widow, the combined Federal estate tax and Utah inheritance tax would be $25,920 with one-half of the excess of the estate
above this amount being taxed at a 32 percent rate rather than the
60 percent rate in the Philippines. I have not had an opportunity
to thoroughly research the double taxation effect if both the
Philippines and the United States seek a tax on the same estate.

WU 1211 (ftl-70)
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(DD) I concur in your opinion that probate of the Philippine Will in
the Philippines is desirable. We have filed the other Will for probate
in Utah, together with the codicil and I believe you should also include
the codicil in the Philippine probate even though it does not affect the
provisions of the Will. We will endeavor to determine through Mr. King
the day of the month which should have been filled in on the codicil.
(EE) With respect to the burden and expense involved in probating the
Philippine Will in the Philippines, as I indicated in the letter to Mrs.
Grimm which I am sure you have, both of the attesting witnesses to the
Philippine Will which was executed in San Francisco are deceased. We
should be able, however, to prove the validity of the document and the
compliance with the requirements of California law through the law partner
of Mr. Roth, the attorney who drafted the Will, who should be able to
identify the signatures of the attesting witnesses as well as the signatr
of Mr. Grimm. If you will advise us as to the nature of the information
you would want included, we can either obtain an affidavit from Mr. Georg
0. Bahrs, the law partner of Mr. Roth, or we can arrange to take his
deposition.
(FF) With respect to the validity of the testamentary provisions of the
Philippine Will under Utah law you should be aware that as of July 1, 197
Utah adopted the Uniform Probate Code with some minor variations. Under
Utah law if the Philippine Will were probated here, the Will would be
upheld according to its terms and distribution under the Will would be
permitted even though it were contrary to the Utah law which would apply
in the case of intestate succession. Section 75-2-602, Utah Code Annotat
1953, as amended, provides that the meaning and legal effect of a disposi
tion in a Will shall be determined by the local law of a particular state
selected by the testator in his instrument unless the application of that
WU1211(Rfr4t)
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law is contrary to the provisions relating to the elective share of a
surviving spouse. Under Section 75-2-201, Utah Code Annotated, if a
married person domiciled in this state dies, the surviving spouse has a
right of election to take in lieu of the Will an elective share equal
to approximately one-third of the decedent's estate. If a married perse
not domiciled in this state dies, the right, if any, of the surviving
spouse to take an elective share is governed by the law of the decedent1
domicile at death. No provision is made under Utah law for an elective
share by children. Utah is not a community property state but would
recognize community property acquired in another jurisdiction. Under
Section 75-2-302 provision is made for pretermitted children if a testat
fails to provide for them in his Will but this would not apply to the
present estate because the decedent recognized the existence of all of
his children.
In answer to your question,Utah does not have compulsory heirs and exce]
for the widow's one-third elective share a decedent can disinherit his h
if he so desires. Under the Utah law of succession, if Mr. Grimm had
died intestate, one-half of his estate would have passed to his widow ai
the remaining one-half would have been divided -equally among his four
children. It might further be noted at this point that the trust creat<
by Mr. Grimm would have been recognized under Utah law as valid even
though its provisions were contrary to the decedent's Will or the
succession laws of the State of Utah. Utah would recognize the validit;
of the trust as overriding the Will of the decedent unless it could be
proved that the decedent was incompetent or acting under fraud or undue
influence at the time the trust was executed.
(GG) In answer to your principal inquiry under this section, it would
appear that in view of Section 75-2-602 of the Utah law referred to abo
that the dispositions by the decedent in his Philippine Will in accorda
WUtt11(*«-M)
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with Philippine law should be given effect since the decedent indicated
in that document that the Philippine law should control. This should
end the matter even though under Utah law the result might be different.
(HH) I believe your inquiry under this section has already been answerec
since Section 75-2-602 provides for the local law selected by the testate
to govern. This section specifically refers to the law of a particular
state but I believe the same rule would apply to the selection of the lav
of a foreign country. It would therefore be my opinion that the Philippd
Will should be governed by Philippine law even though inconsistent with
the laws of the State of Utah because of the conflict of law rule referrc
to above. Prior to the above referred code section, Utah would have adoj
the common law rule that the law of the domicile controls the validity oi
the Will and successional rights.
(II) With respect to the legal effect of the trust agreement, both U. S,
aftd Utah law would be the same as the Philippine law and include the
assets of the trust in the estate for death tax purposes. However, as
indicated above, under Utah law the assets of the trust would not be subj
to collation in determining the compulsory share of the heirs.
(JJ) As indicated above we will obtain an affidavit from Mr. King with
respect to the date of the execution of the codicil and will send a copy
of the codicil, certified by the Utah probate court, to you as soon as
possible.
In summary, I might suggest for your guidance the following feelings whi<
I have after reading your cable:
(1) I believe the Philippine Will should be offered for probate
in the Philippines as soon as possible and that personal
representatives should be appointed tl^ere in accordance
with the Will.
WU1211(ftft-M)
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(2) My principal concern about domicile relates to the
high rate of taxation in the Philippines which we
will probably not avoid as to a substantial portion
of the property even by contesting the domicile.
(3) Because of the condition of many of the assets and
business interests perhaps you will be more successful
in negotiating values for tax purposes in the
Philippines than we would be in the U. S.
(4) There may be some merit after considering all of the
circumstances and discussing the matter with Mrs.
Grimm to try to work out some settlement with the two
daughters by the prior marriage as to the percentage
of the Philippine estate in which they will be entitled
to participate, particularly if the assets in the trust
could be left intact.
(5) Once the foregoing questions are resolved, it will be
imperative to commence the preparation of an accurate
inventory of the decedent's assets.
I will anticipate having an opportunity in the near future to
talk with you.
David E. Salisbury

WU 1211 (RI-70)
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Text of handwritten letter from Edward "Pete" Grimm to David
Salisbury, dated March 29, 1978:
David I have a question. As I understand it aren't the inheritance
taxes dependent upon the amount the wife gets? (she gets hers,
up to 50% of the estate, tax free - tax is then computed on the
remainder. For the US, it is the marital deduction that allows
this - in the PI, it is community property.) So how can you
agree to split up an amount that can't be determined until you
first know how it's going to be split up?
Mother I'm sure is sending you a copy of Ethel's proposed
agreement - it's like we mentioned, 25% of after-tax estate to
her and Nita. Look at my chart (Rows 1-4) on line one - if the
wife takes half, the total after-tax estate is maximized. However,
under Ethel's plan, the wife doesn't get half - she and the other
two children (Linda and I) combined get 4.88 (48%) of the original
10. So the wife has to, subsequent to estate taxes, take .12 of
the assets that were put into her name (so as to qualify for the
marital deduction) and gift them to Ethel and Nita.
Under your proposed 60/10/10/10/10 plan, (Rows 5-8) Ethel
and Nita (Column 6) never get more than is available for the
children (Column 4) - but they get the greatest portion of it.
That's why I talked of some deal that splits up Column 4 the after-tax estate.
The .75 isn't very much, but look what happens without the
marital deduction - they get the same (Row 13). I'm having trouble
with the rows and columns.
Is that idea sound though? I'm assuming that the first wife
has no claim on anything (it being 30 years now since the dissolution of that conjugal partnership).
If Mom weren't around at all, they might hope for 50% of the
after-tax estate, or 1.50 - but no more (Row 13).
I can see that Linda and I might give up some of our portion
of the children's share (Column 4) as the interest we would get
in Mom's half is worth something. But I don't see why, as under
Ethel's formulae, we should get only a future/hoped for interest
in Mom's half - let alone the possibility that Mom might not even
get her half.
I haven't considered the effects of not reporting any portions
of the estate.

-1-
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x.25

x.5

x.75

1-

10

5

5

1.5

6 .5

1.63

3.25

4.88

2-

10

4

6

1.8

5 ^8

1.45

2.90

4.35

3-

10

3

7

2.1

5 •1

1.28

2.55

3.83

4-

10

2

8

2.4

4 f4

1.10

2.20

3.30

20%

10

60%

5

5

1.5

6, 5

1.3

3.9

6-

4

6

1.8

5.8

1.16

3.48

7-

3

7

2.1

5.1

1.02

3.06

8-

2

8

2.4

4. 4

.88

2.64

5-

50%
9-

1.5

10-

1.8

.90

11-

2.1

1.05

12-

2.4

1.20
x.25

13-

10

—

10

3

r^

x.5

x.75

1.50

2.25
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I looked at a lot of other numbers, but nothing popped out.
They probably look like yours. I figured the best they could do
might be 2.6 of 10 - and that's high. The worst - nothing.
I'm not sure what's fair - but I certainly don't like her
scheme.
If Ethel thought these numbers came from me I don't know that
she'd even look at them.
Thanks for all your help.
(Signed)

Pete
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Mrs. Maxine T. Grimm
Mr. Edward M. Grimm, II
P. 0. Box 569
Tooele, Utah
8407A
Re:

Estate of Edward M. Grimm, deceased.

Dear Maxine and Pete:
Attached hereto you will find a copy of a letter which I
plan to send this date to all of the beneficiaries of the estate.
After lengthy consideration, I have concluded that I can no longer
effectively represent the estate on the basis that was originally
contemplated and that you no longer wish me to do so.
Early last year (1978), when I was engaged by you to render
legal services for your husband's and father's estate, it was my
understanding that our firm would represent the entire estate on
a worldwide basis and would endeavor to handle matters relating
to the estate in a way that would be beneficial to all of the
beneficiaries. We realized in the beginning that there was a conflict between the various family interests, but following the signing of the Agreement of April 25, 1978 (the "Agreement"), we hoped
that all of the beneficiaries would work together for their common
interests to complete the administration and distribution of the
•state.
It has been apparent for many months that you, Maxine, both
in your role as principal beneficiary, and as one of the personal
representatives in both probate proceedings, have not wanted me and
my law firm to function in that role. Contrary to my understanding and that aet forth in the Agreement, you have not advised us
or consulted with us concerning the hiring of accountants and
attorneys or in connection with a number of important decisions
and changes affecting the estate. It was, of course, contemplated
that attorneys in other areas would be vital to the proper administration of the estate. However, information vital to the estate

it.to
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and to decisions affecting the estate have not been channeled
through our firm and recommendations which we have made concerning matters abroad have either been ignored or have not been
followed. This places us in an untenable position with you and
with the other beneficiaries who were given to believe that we
would be coordinating the legal work involved in administering
the estate.
I believe that in many ways the estate has made considerable
progress in the past 20 months that I have been associated with
it. There are many important decisions now awaiting decisive
action. Within the next few months, there will be many other
important problems to solve and matters to be negotiated. Maybe
it will not be possible for any one individual or firm to represent
the estate but it will be vital if these matters are to be resolved
without litigation cm every issue that the attorney for the estate
have the confidence and support of all of the beneficiaries involved.
I ^ BOTTy t a a L this decision has been necessary. 1 have
enjoyed my association with you and with the others involved in
the estate and T certainly wish you well beyond this point.
1 will submit a statement for our services which have not been
billed and I will cooperate fully with whomever is selected to
represent the estate,
Very truly yours,

DES/to

David II Salisbury

End.
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April 6, 1978

Mr. Rex Roberts
Post Office Box 215
Greenhills Post Office
Rizal, Philippines
Dear .M:i -. Roberts:
As I have indicated to you by telephone, we have
been negotiating with David Salisbury to obtain a stipulation
in connection with the petition for probate pending before the
Tooele County Court. After extensive discussions with Mr*
Salisbury and consultation with Mr. Mike Matthews, we have
entered into a stipulation, a copy of which is enclosed. As
you will note, matters involving domicile and heirship will
not be resolved by the court at this time. Nonetheless, we
will plan to attend the court hearing to make sure there are
no unexpected developments.
Meanwhile, as I have indicated . . * -,• Salisbury
has expressed a desire to settle the case. 1 agret with him
that if a satisfactory settlement could be reached, the parties
would then be able to work together to obtain the best possible
results under the tax laws and in ascertaining the existence
and location of assets. However, Mr. Salisbury does not
believe that the agreement contained in your letter of March
31, 1978, sets forth his understanding of what is intended.
The principal difference has to do with the xnarita] deduction.
Mr. Salisbury believes that Maxine Tate Grimm should be entitled
to claim a full marital deduction before estate taxes and the
remainder of the estate after taxes would be divided equally
among the four children.
Mr. Salisbury has made a series of calculations under
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various assumptions as to his view of how the estate would be
divided in the absence of an agreement. There are a variety
of issues involved in these assumptions, but they do present
some indication of his thinking.
From time to time we have been advised that your
Philippine lawyers have researched the Philippine laws of
succession. As soon as possible we would appreciate all the
information they can provide on this subject. Also, it would
be helpful to have your lawyers react to the calculations
contained in connection with Mr. Salisbury's assumptions.
Some of the other issues involved in the case
include the question of domicile and the accompanying issues
of succession and taxation. Another significant issue is
community property ramifications, including determination of
how much of the estate of the deceased has been accumulated
since the second marriage. Another issue is the possibility
of fraudulent concealment in connection with the divorce
settlement of the first marriage. That issue would substantially
affect the community property concepts. Relating to the issue
of fraudulent concealment are such matters as the statute of
limitations, laches, and complicated factual matters relating
to the status of the property holdings cit the time of the
divorce and whether there was in fact concealment. Another
issue relates to the validity of the irrevocable trust and
transfers into the trust. Another issue is whether certain
property which is known to be in existence is to be included
in the estate. Indeed, there are a variety of issues, both
legal and factual relating to each principal issue, none of
which has been developed to the point where we can present a
concrete opinion. One fundamental issue, of course, concerns
the assets of the estate and where the assets are located.
These issues could either be resolved by factual and
legal preparation and ultimate litigation, or any of them could
be avoided as a practical matter through an agreement. At
this time an agreement which would offer sufficient protection
to your rights seems to be the best course of action.
We have tentatively agreed to meet with Mr. Salisbury
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on April 18 to discuss further settlement. I believe it
would be well for you and Mr. Matthews tp attend the meeting
in Salt Lake City.
Sincarely yours,

Donal^ B. Holbrook
DBH/br
Encl.
cc: Mr. Michael Matthews
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